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INTRODUCTION

What becomes of the owner-managed firm when its participants can no longer trust each other? What if some have simply
become disenchanted with their colleagues? Should participants
be entitled to withdraw their investment at will, as a matter of
self-help? Or should the law deem preservation of the community to be paramount and permit participants to withdraw only
upon demonstrating that their fellow owners are not
trustworthy?
The answers to these questions depend upon whether the
enterprise has been organized as a partnership or as a corporation. Partnership law establishes a norm that partners should settle their disputes via dissolution, liquidation and winding up of
the firm.' A partnership may be dissolved at will by any partner
at any time-without judicial involvement.2 The power to dis* Associate Professor, Tulane University School of Law. B.A., Northwestern
University 1974; J.D., Tulane University School of Law 1980. The author wishes to
thank William Bratton, Deborah DeMott, Frank Easterbrook, Roberta Karmel,
Therese Maynard, John Stick and Robert Thompson for their helpful comments on
an earlier draft. Special thanks to my friend and former colleague, Robert W. Hillman, whose comments (on more than one draft) and conversations about this topic
helped focus my thinking and are deeply appreciated. Thanks also to Johnny
Cheng-Teh Chiu, Tulane Law School class of '92, for providing many hours of
diligent research assistance, and to Gary Eisnenberg and Wadjid Saddiqui, class of
'90, for additional research assistance. All errors are, of course, my own.
I See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 29, 30, 33 (1914). The Uniform Partnership
Act (U.P.A.), has been adopted in all states except Louisiana. All references to the
U.P.A. will be to the 1914 text.
2 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31. While a partner has the power to dissolve the

partnership at any time, the U.P.A. distinguishes between rightful dissolutions
(those that are allowed under the partnership agreement), and wrongful dissolutions (those that breach. the partnership agreement; e.g., premature dissolution of a

partnership formed for a specified term of years). Id. §§ 31(1), 31(2)). Wrongfully
dissolving partners may pay a price for their breach, although the price may not be
enough to deter dissolution. Robert W. Hillman, Indissoluble Partnerships,37 U. FLA.

L. REV. 691, 715-17 (1985).
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solve gives partners an important self-help remedy for a co-venturer's actual, or perceived, breach of fiduciary duty: in effect it
allows the offended partner to withdraw her investment from the
firm by forcing a buy-out of her share of the business.' In addition, even if a partner wanted to sue the other partners for
breach of a fiduciary duty, partnership law has traditionally prohibited such action. At common law, a partner could not bring
an action at law against another partner except in the course of a
dissolution, liquidation or winding up of the firm. 4 That rule survived the adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act (U.P.A.) and,
although subject to important exceptions, the rule remains the
norm.5 Partnership law thus inextricably links fiduciary obliga3 The right to dissolve, thus, amounts to the right to be bought out. A simple
illustration will demonstrate how the U.P.A. achieves that result. Suppose that A,
B, and C are partners and that they have not constituted the firm for a fixed term or
a particular undertaking. Under § 31(l)(b) of the U.P.A., A may dissolve the firm
rightfully-that is, "without violation of the agreement between the partners."
UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Act § 31(l)(b). Suppose A does in fact dissolve the firm.
Under U.P.A. § 38(1), A has the right to liquidate the business-that is, to "have
the partnership property applied to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus applied
to pay in cash the net amount owing to the respective partner." UNIF. PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 38(1). Suppose further, however that B and C wish to continue the business.
While they have no legal right to do so, they can always make it worth A's while to
forego her staturoty right to liquidate. How? By the simple expedient of buying
her share of the business at a price she is willing to accept. The end result is that A
can always force a buy out by dissolving and threating to liquidate.
Even if the partnership has been constituted for a term, A's power to dissolve
operates as the power to force a buy-out. Under U.P.A. § 31(2), A has the power to
dissolve even if doing so "contraven[es] . . . the agreement between the parties."
UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31(2). In such a case, B and C have the statutory right to
continue the business. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 38(2)(b). If they choose to exercise that right, they must pay A "the value of [A's] interest in the partnership"that is, they must buy her out. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 38(2)(b). The U.P.A. further provides, however, that in valuing A's share, the "goodwill of the business
shall not be considered," UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 38(2)(c)(II), and that A's share
is to be reduced by any damages caused by A's premature withdrawal. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 38(2)(b).
4 Bullard v. Kinney, 10 Cal. 60, 63 (1858). See generally DANIEL W. FESSLER,
ALTERNATIVES TO INCORPORATION FOR PERSONS IN QUEST OF PROFIT 113-14 (3d ed.
1991).
5 See Hosking v. Spartan Properties, Inc., 275 Cal. App.2d, 152, 156-57, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 893, 895-96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); Ewing v. Owens, 441 P.2d 964, 967 (Okla.
1968) (general partner may not sue another partner, at law, for partnership transactions until the partnership affairs and accounts have been liquidated and settled); 2
ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP
§ 6.08, at 6:95 (1988) (courts generally preclude partners from bringing claims
against the partnership except for requests for an accounting); The proposed Revised Uniform Partnership Act would abolish this rule and permit a partner to
.maintain an action for legal.., relief.., to... protect the rights and interests of
[a] partner." REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 406(b)(5) (Tentative Draft, Feb. 7,
1992).
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tions to the dissolution of the firm.
On the other hand, the rules are markedly different if the
enterprise is a close corporation. Absent a contrary provision in
the certificate of incorporation, most states generally allow voluntary dissolution of a business corporation only with the approval of the board of directors and a majority of the outstanding
shares.' A minority shareholder, therefore, typically must enlist
the aid of the courts to obtain dissolution. The grounds for
court-ordered dissolution have traditionally been quite narrow:
deadlock among the directors7 or the shareholders,' or proof
that those in control of the corporation have acted illegally, oppressively or fraudulently. 9 Moreover, shareholders, unlike partners, are entitled to redress controllers' wrongdoing by suing for
damages-either directly on their own behalf,' 0 or derivatively
on behalf of the corporation." Under corporation law, therefore, the enforcement of fiduciary obligations has traditionally
been separate and distinct from dissolution of the enterprise.
6 See, e.g., 2 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 14.02(b) (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1991)
(requiring majority vote of all shareholders entitled to vote). Cf DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, §§ 275(a), (b), (c) (1991) (also allowing dissolution, without board approval,
by unanimous written consent of stockholders); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1900(a) (West
1990) (only 50% vote required for voluntary dissolution); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 1001 (McKinney 1986) (two-thirds vote required).
7 The deadlock must be so serious that irreparable injury to the corporation has
resulted or is threatened. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(2) (West 1990); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30(2) (1991); 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 14.30(2)(i) (3d
ed. 1985 & Supp. 1991); cf DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(2) (1991) (providing for
appointment of a custodian in case of director deadlock; the custodian, however, is
specifically denied authority to liquidate the firm "except when the Court shall
otherwide order"). For a general discussion of grounds for dissolution due to
deadlock, see Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders' Reasonable
Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q 193, 201-05 (1988).
8 The deadlock among the shareholders must be sufficient to prevent them
from electing directors for a minimum period of time, often two years. See CAL.
CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(3) (West 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1104(c) (McKinney
1986); 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 14.30(2)(iii) (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1991); cf
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(1) (1991) (providing for appointment of custodian
in case of shareholders' inability, at any meeting, to elect successors to directors
whose terms are expiring; the custodian, however, is specifically denied authority to
liquidate the firm "except when the Court shall otherwise order").
9 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(4) (West 1990); 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. § 14.30(2)(ii) (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1991).
10 See, e.g., Knapp v. Bankers Sec. Corp., 230 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1956) (direct
action to compel the payment of dividends); cf. Gordon v. Elliman, 119 N.E.2d 331
(N.Y. 1954) (stockholder action to compel dividends must be brought derivatively).
The Gordon decision was later overruled by statute. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626
(McKinney 1986).
11 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (1991); CAL. CORP. CODE § 800 (West 1990);
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 626 (McKinney 1986).
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In recent years, however, a number of jurisdictions have begun to forge a link between fiduciary duty and dissolution in
close corporations. These jurisdictions have added another
ground for judicial dissolution of such firms, namely, that those
in control have acted in a way that is unfairly prejudicial to the
complaining shareholders, or that dissolution is necessary to pro'1 2
tect the complaining shareholders' "rights or interests.'
Courts have interpreted such legislation to permit a minority
shareholder to withdraw her investment by dissolution of the
firm or by redemption of her shares when the majority shareholders have breached their fiduciary obligation by frustrating
the minority's "reasonable expectations."'" To be sure, such a
rule does not-at least not fully-mirror partnership law's preference for dissolution when co-venturers cannot cooperate, but it
is a step in that direction.
Some commentators object to the modem trend in close
corporation law, arguing that those who choose to form close
corporations, rather than partnerships, thereby choose to be governed by corporate-not partnership-law principles.' 4 Other
commentators would further expand the modem trend, arguing
that minority shareholders of close corporations should have the
right to demand, at any time, that the majority shareholders, or
the corporation itself, purchase the minority's shares. 5 Their ar12 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(5) (West 1990); see also N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 1104-a(b)(2) (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAr. § 55-14-30(2)(ii) (1991).
13 In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984); Meiselman v.
Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (N.C. 1983); In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141,
153-55, 400 A.2d 554, 560-61 (Law Div. 1979); Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d
351, 357-58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
14 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 250 (1991). Implicit in this reasoning is that a person who knowingly acquires a minority stake in a close corporation must accept that the majority
shareholders will have managerial prerogative over the deployment of corporate
assets, the distribution of corporate profits and the duration of the enterprise. The
majority's decisions will usually benefit the minority shareholders. If not, the close
corporation entity could not survive as a form of business organization because no
one would be willing to be a minority shareholder. Accordingly, Easterbrook and
Fischel argue, minority shareholders neither need nor want the self-help protection
of the right to dissolve the corporation at will. Id. at 243. Moreover, the majority
shareholders' fiduciary obligations should operate, as they do in publicly traded
corporations, to redress those few instances in which egregious wrongs are committed by those in control. Id. at 243-48.
15 J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation:A Proposed
Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 45
(1977). An earlier proposal, which came close to advocating free dissolution for
close corporations, is discussed in Carlos L. Israels, The Sacred Cow of CorporateExist-
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gument is that, without such a right, minority shareholders have
no means of protecting themselves against majority shareholders' abuses.' 6 In practical effect, granting an automatic buyout
right to minority shareholders renders close corporations, like
partnerships, dissolvable at the will of any shareholder.' 7
Both the proponents and the detractors of allowing minority
shareholders to withdraw at will agree that it is self-interest that
motivates participants in close corporations. Those who advocate at-will withdrawal focus upon the conflicting nature of the
shareholders' individual interests. Hetherington and Dooley, for
example, maintain that under ideal conditions, the close corporation will operate by consensus: "[E]ach member voting in his
perceived self-interest will select the course of action preferred
ence: Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 778 (1952) (advocating
broad requirements of unanimous shareholder consent for close corporation action, so that a dissatisfied shareholder could obtain judicial dissolution on grounds
of deadlock).
16 Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 15, at 46-47. The buyout right has been
criticized as being too protective of minority shareholders because it allows the
minority to demand to be bought out even when the majority shareholders have
not engaged in any objectionable behavior and even though a buyout would harm
the majority. See Robert W. Hillman, The DissatisfiedParticipantin the Solvent Business
Venture: A Consideration of the Relative Permanence of Partnershipsand Close Corporations,
67 MINN. L. REV. 1, 69-72 (1982). Proponents of the buyout right, however, maintain that allowing minority shareholders to shift their investments, even when the
majority has done no wrong, promotes the efficient allocation of resources and results in a healthier economy. Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 15, at 44. See also
J.A.C. Hetherington, Defining the Scope of ControllingShareholders'FiduciaryResponsibilities, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 9, 39 (1987) (arguing that litigation in the close corporation context results from the majority shareholders' exploitation of its controlling
position to obtain a disproportionate portion of the corporation's value).
17 The minority buyout right, as proposed by Hetherington & Dooley, does not
have exactly the same effect as the right to dissolve a partnership at will. Under
their proposal, the minority shareholders may not voluntarily dissolve the corporation, but may only petition for judicial dissolution on the ground that the majority
shareholders have refused the minority's buyout demand. Hetherington & Dooley,
supra note 15, at 56-57. The majority shareholders would, however, retain the right
to dissolve at will-that is, without having to resort to the courts. Id. at 58. Still,
under the Hetherington & Dooley proposal, a grant ofjudicial dissolution to a minority shareholder is intended to be perfunctory, dependent only upon whether the
majority shareholders have acceded to the minority's buyout demand. Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 15, at 46. Such "no-fault" judicial dissolution, while procedurally more cumbersome than a voluntary dissolution at will, closely resembles
the voluntary dissolution in practical effect.
Under the U.P.A., no such distinction is made between majority and minority
partners. Any partner, whether holding a minority or a majority stake in the firm,
may rightfully dissolve the partnership at will unless the partnership is for a term, in
which case no partner, whether majority or minority, may rightfully dissolve at will.
UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 31.
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by the other members since all have common interests."' 8 When
consensus among the participants breaks down, the predictable
consequence is that one faction will seek a strategic advantage
over the other, such as when the majority shareholders exploit
the minority by using their position "to capture a significant portion of the [minority's] 'share' of the firm's income and profits."' 19
Hetherington and Dooley's proposal for the minority shareholders' right to withdraw at will is aimed at preventing such strategic
behavior.
By contrast, opponents of at-will withdrawal focus upon the
complementary nature of the shareholders' self-interest. Easterbrook and Fischel, for example, reason that majority shareholders desire capital, while minority shareholders desire a
competitive return on investment. Such goals are entirely compatible. Moreover, the existence of competition ensures that
each party can get what it wants: "[T]here are tens of thousands
of closely held firms that must compete against each other for
talent and capital. This competition requires firms to make believable (i.e., enforceable) promises of equal or greater anticipated return in order to attract capital." ' 20 In essence, the debate
over dissolution and fiduciary obligations in close corporations
reflects two perspectives from which self-interest can be viewed.
On the one hand, self-interest may be understood as a phenomenon that inevitably produces conflicts of interest, which the law
must mediate. On the other, self-interest may be seen as the
driving force behind the production of economic gains, which the
law must not impede.
This article explores the issue of dissolution and fiduciary
18 Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 15, at 2.
19 Id. at 4.

& FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 232. See also Hillman, supra note
16, at 3 (The shareholders' "common objective of maximizing a return on the capital and services invested binds together individuals with potentially conflicting interests and facilitates the resolution of differences.").
Easterbrook and Fischel's assertion that closely-held firms "compete against
each other for talent and capital" is problematic. Any such competition is quite
narrow because many closely held firms are founded by associates who know and
trust each other and who do not invite strangers to join the enterprise. Moreover,
with respect to a particularsmall firm, any competition With other firms for a minority participant's capital is no longer a constraint once the participant's investment
has been made (unless it is easy to divest and redeploy the capital, which is usually
not the case). Still, relying upon this notion of competition to explain why anyone
would take a minority position in a closely.held firm is attractive so long as the prior
assumption, that all participants are motivated exclusively by self-interest, is
accepted.
20 EASTERBROOK
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obligations in the close corporation from a somewhat different
perspective. The analysis developed here is inspired by feminist
critiques of the view that human beings are essentially separated
from others and motivated simply by self-interest. 2 ' According
to such critiques, people are not essentially separate individuals,
but rather inherently relational creatures. 2 Our basic motivations
include more than just self-interest; we are also driven by concern for the welfare of others.2 3 We are not, in other words, exclusively devoted to the pursuit of our own interests. Nor are we
exclusively devoted to serving others' needs. We are all more
complicated than that. As we grow and develop, we seek to define ourselves-not in a vacuum, but through relationships with
others. Moreover, a fundamental and naturally arising aspect of
our close, personal relationships is caring-that is, receptivity to
the other's reality, and willingness to respond to the other's
needs.24
In addition, for reasons discussed in Part I below 25 this article focuses not on close corporations generally, but rather on
one type of close corporation: the owner-managed firm in which
all of the shareholders expect to be active in management. The
owner-managed close corporation is very similar to the small,
egalitarian partnership in that the co-venturers in both types of
21 For a description and critique of the "separation thesis," see Robin West,
Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988). For general discussions of the
separation thesis, see CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982); JEAN BAKER MILLER, TOWARD A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN (1976).
22 See, e.g., Nancy Julia Chodorow, Toward a Relational Individualism: The Mediation
of Self Through Psychoanalysis, in RECONSTRUCTING INDIVIDUALISM: AUTONOMY, INDIVIDUALITY, AND THE SELF IN WESTERN THOUGHT 197, 202 (Thomas C. Heller et al.
eds., 1986) (describing "the self" as "inexorably social and intrinsically connected"). Chodorow accepts another commentator's elaboration of this point:
We tend to think of any one individual in isolation; it is a convenient
fiction.... There is no such thing as a single human being, pure and
simple, unmixed with other human beings. Each personality ... is a
composite structure which has been and is being formed and built up
since the day of our birth out of countless never-ending influences
and exchanges between ourselves and others.
Id. at 202-03 (quoting Joan Riviere, The Unconscious Phantasy of an Inner World Reflected in Examplesfrom Literature, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 358-59 (Melanie Klein et al. eds., 1977)).
23 See NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION 4 (1982) ("Taking relation as ontologically basic simply means that we recognize human encounter and affective response as a basic fact of human
existence.") (emphasis in original).
24 NODDINGS, supra note 23, at 79.
25 See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
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enterprise share a close, personal relationship. The thesis of this
article is to explore the implications for the law governing ownermanaged firms, the notions of human relatedness and natural
caring. Ultimately, the article argues that the rules governing the
relationship among owner-managers should lead them to talk to
each other, to listen to each other and to compromise when disputes or conflicts arise between them.
Part I advances the view that the "nexus of contracts" theory
of corporate law provides a good starting point for examining
corporate fiduciary obligations and dissolution rules. In accordance with that theory, the rights and obligations of firm owners
and managers should arise out of their contract, which defines
their express and implied expectations and understandings.26
That view provides a basis for critiquing corporate law rules according to whether they further or undermine the parties' expectations. The article then contrasts the expectations of passive
investors in publicly traded corporations with those of ownermanagers of close corporations concerning four key aspects of
participation in a business enterprise: the investment (and divestment) decision; return on investment; governance of the firm;
and agency costs.
Part II reviews and discusses corporate fiduciary obligation
law and corporate dissolution rules. It argues that corporate fiduciary rules, which are dominated by the business judgment
rule, substantially further the expectations of passive investors in
publicly traded corporations and that the voluntary dissolution
rule is mildly supportive of, but largely irrelevant to, the passive
investors' expectations. At the same time, Part II shows that such
rules operate to undermine owner-managers' tacit understandings about their interrelationship.
Part III considers alternatives to the traditional corporate regime. It examines the modern trend in close corporation law, as
well as two other approaches, with a view to determining which
approach best reflects the reality of the owner-managers' relationship. The article concludes that the best approach is to permit voluntary dissolution of the firm at the will of any participant.
26 For a criticism of the notion that fiduciary obligations can be contractually
based, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1724-29 (1990).
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PART I

A.

The Nexus of Contracts Theoiy of the Corporation

The law deems a corporation to be an independent, juridical
person. 2 7 The corporation's personhood, of course, is a legal fiction which is useful in, among other things, conceptualizing the
limited liability of shareholders for the corporation's debts. As a
juridical person, the corporation alone is liable for its own debts
and has the capacity to sue and be sued. A corporation also enjoys certain constitutional rights including rights of free speech,28
29
equal protection and due process of 3law,
and protection against
0
seizures.
and
searches
unreasonable
In recent years, however, the "nexus of contracts" theory of
corporate law has emerged to challenge the view of the corporation as a "person." According to this theory, the firm should not
be seen as an entity, but as a web or nexus of contracts. 3 ' Within
this nexus of contractual relationships, there are three types of
participants.3 2 First are the managers, who enter into the many
contracts that comprise the firm and are the firm's focal point.
Second are the "fixed claimants" consisting of suppliers, lenders,
employees and customers whose contracts with management entitles them to a fixed amount. Third are the "residual claimants"
27 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636,37
(1819).
28 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, reh 'g denied, 438 U.S. 907
(1978).
29 Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949) (equal protection);
Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889) (due process); Santa
Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (equal protection).
30 G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
31 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 1-39; Daniel R. Fischel, The
CorporateGovernance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1261-62 (1982); William A.
Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J.

1521, 1522-24 (1982); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11
(1976); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Eco-

nomic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 783 (1972).
The observation that the corporation is not an entity is not, in itself, new. See,
e.g., Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636 ("A corporation is an
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.").
For historical perspectives of the contract theory of the firm, see David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201; William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic
Theory of the Firm: CriticalPerspectives From History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989). For
a critical legal perspective, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation:A CriticalAppraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989).
32 Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88J. POL. ECON. 288,

290-92 (1980).
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who are the shareholders, whose contract with management entitles them to the residual-whatever remains after the payment of
all fixed claims.
The notion that shareholders are residual claimants, and not
owners, is a central insight offered by the contract theory of the
firm. Because the firm is simply the focal point of a complex bargaining process, it cannot be owned by anyone.33 Moreover, the
management's contract is with the shareholders,3 4 not with a corporate "person" that is "owned" by shareholders. Accordingly,
whatever fiduciary duties the management owes to the shareholders must arise out of their contract. Specifically, they do not arise
as a result of the manager's status as a servant of a fictional entity
or its so-called owners. Thus, the manager's fiduciary obligation
to shareholders is a matter that should be freely bargained without government intervention. 35 In theory, the shareholders
could agree to relieve managers altogether of their fiduciary
obligations. 36
Proponents of the nexus of contracts theory, however, do
33 Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal
Treatment of FundamentalCorporateChanges, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 175; Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 31, at 789 n.14.
34 That is, the contract is with the shareholders as a group, not as individuals with
differing, and sometimes divergent, interests. Contractarians assume shareholders
have a unitary interest in maximizing their wealth by maximizing corporate profitability. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. The same assumption underlies the traditional formulation of the corporate manager's obligation. See Roberta
S. Karmel, The Duty of Directors to Non-Shareholder Constituencies in Control Transactions
-A Comparison of U.S. and U.K. Law, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 61, 75 (1990). Interestingly, in light of the emerging trend in publicly traded corporations to issue
multiple classes of common stock carrying varied voting, dividend and liquidation
rights, that assumption may ultimately need to be revised. See Henry T.C. Hu, New
FinancialProducts, the Modern Process of FinancialInnovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder
Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1273 (1991).
35 EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 14, at 7-8. For other deregulatory implications arising out of the contract theory, see, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness
to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9
(1984)(discussing deregulation of insider trading); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R.
Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983)(discussing deregulation of insider trading); EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 14, at 109-44
(arguing against state anti-takeover regulation).
36 For discussions on opting out of traditional corporate law rules (including
fiduciary duties), see Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting out of Fiduciary
Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians,65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990); Robert B.
Thompson, The Law's Limits on Contracts in a Corporation, 15J. CORP. L. 377 (1990);
Symposium, ContractualFreedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989);
John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, The ContractualTheory of the Corporation,and
the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919 (1988); Paul N. Cox, Reflections on
Ex Ante Compensation and Diversificationof Risk as FairnessJustifications
for Limiting Fiduci-
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not advocate relieving managers of an obligation to serve the
shareholders' interests. On the contrary, they posit that, in the
absence of some alternative understanding, shareholders and
managers have an enforceable implied agreement that the managers will devote their efforts to maximizing the wealth of the
shareholders.3 7 To perform that undertaking, managers have a
general obligation to direct the business of the corporation with
due care and loyalty to the shareholders' interests-precisely
what the law of fiduciary obligation requires them to do.
Thus, the nexus of contracts theory does not purport to
redefine the content of corporate fiduciary duties. Rather, the
theory recharacterizes fiduciary duty rules as default rules, i.e., a
set of off-the-rack contract terms that best captures the express
and implied agreements of most shareholders and managers. 31
Such default rules benefit the great majority of shareholders and
managers by sparing the expense of bargaining for rules themselves. Proponents of the contract theory accept that the best
default rule is the one that currently applies: managers owe duary Obligations of CorporateOfficers, Directors'andControllingShareholders, 60 TEMP. L.Q.
47 (1987).
Curiously, there has been no corresponding groundswell of scholarship arguing that partners should have the contractual freedom to eliminate the fiduciary
duties they owe each other, although the partnership has traditionally been considered an essentially contractual enterprise. See Thomas Lee Hazen, The Corporate
Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure,and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REV. 273, 294-95
(1991). The February 1992 draft of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, however,
takes a step in that direction. The draft explicitly provides that partners owe each
other three distinct fiduciary duties: (1) a duty of good faith and fair dealing; (2) a
duty of loyalty; and (3) a duty of care. REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404 (Tentative Draft Feb. 7, 1992). The draft states that the duty of good faith and fair dealing
may not be eliminated by agreement, but is silent and, therefore, presumably permissive as to partners' opt-out rights with respect to their duty of loyalty and duty
of care. Id. at §§ 404(a), 105(a)(2).
37 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1191 (1981) ("So long
as it continues to be lawful to form corporations for profit, shareholders are entitled to hire managers dedicated to the shareholders' interests alone. The duty of
management is to operate efficiently and thus maximize the return to shareholders."); EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 14, at 93 ("To use the fiduciary principle for any purpose other than maximizing the welfare of investors subverts its
function by turning the high costs of direct monitoring-the reason fiduciary principles are needed-into a shield that prevents investors from controlling their
agents' conduct."); Millon, supra note 31, at 224 (fundamental principle of corporate law is that the corporation acts purely for the financial interests of the
shareholders).
38 See Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1987) (absent
express agreement, fiduciary duty is an "off-the-rack" estimate of what the parties
would have agreed to).
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ties of care and loyalty to shareholders. The proponents would
merely add that shareholders and managers should have the freedom to opt out of the default rules and adopt the regime that
39
best suits them.
Despite its seeming neutrality as to content, however,
recharacterizing fiduciary rules as default rules fundamentally alters the source of managers' obligations, and thus requires a radically different analysis of them. Traditionally viewed, the source
of corporate fiduciary duty is the managers' legal imperative to be
selfless servants of the shareholders. 40 The question then becomes whether the managers satisfied that ideal. Under the contractarian view, the source of the managers' duty is their bilateral
contract with the shareholders. This raises the entirely different
issue of whether the shareholders got what they 'expressly or impliedly' bargained for.
39 For example, managers and shareholders of a newspaper publishing corporation should be free to agree that the managers will "publish a newspaper first and
make a profit second." EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 36.
40 Professor DeMott observes that: "[fliduciary obligation thus presupposes that
persons subject to it are capable, at least in some respects, of selfless behavior, that
they are able, at least in defined circumstances, to abjure the immediate pursuit of
self-interest." DEBORAH A. DEMoTT, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP: DUTIES IN ONGOING BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS 2 (1991). Some scholars have
pointed out the difficulty of reconciling this presumption with the assertion that
every individual is concerned solely with his own welfare. Klein, supra note 31, at
1542- 43; Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations:A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1449-50 (1989).
According to traditional understandings of fiduciary law, the circumstances requiring the abdication of self-interest arise when a person acquires the power unilaterally to affect another's welfare. Trustees, agents, guardians, attorneys,
corporate directors and partners hold such power over their beneficiaries, principals, wards, clients, shareholders and co-partners, and are fiduciaries with respect
to the latter. See Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539, 541
(1949) ("The greater the independent authority to be exercised by the fiduciary, the
greater the scope of his fiduciary duty.") (emphasis added). Two assumptions appear to underlie traditional fiduciary principles. The first is that "natural" human
selfishness is a fundamental evil, one of the ramifications of which is that a person
will use her power over others to enrich herself at the weaker person's expense.
The second assumption is that the appropriate societal response to this evil is for a
higher authority (namely, the law) to impose fiduciary restrictions upon the more
powerful.
An alternative response would be to redress the imbalance of power between
the fiduciary and the beneficiary. In some contexts, of course, it is not possible to
empower the beneficiary-as when the beneficiary is a child or a consumer of legal
or other professional services. In the context of publicly traded corporations, however, empowerment of the beneficiary (i.e., the shareholder) is not only feasible
but, according to those who celebrate the nexus of contracts theory, has already
occurred. The development of active and efficient securities markets has empowered shareholders to shift their investments, which imposes meaningful restraints
on corporate managers.
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For publicly traded corporations, there is an obvious difficulty in determining whether the shareholders got what they bargained for. Because the managers unilaterally fix the terms of
the corporate charter, the shareholders do not bargain at all over
the terms of the owner-manager relationship.4 For owner-managed close corporations, however, that objection is inapplicable.
In such enterprises, the participants have a direct, personal relationship. At the outset, they mutually agree, at a minimum, to
their fundamental deal points, such as the allocation of shares,
each shareholder's initial capital contribution and the tasks that
each will perform in the firm. 4 2 In the normal course of operating the company, they will interact with each other regularly and
frequently. They will discuss the condition of the business, identify weaknesses and consider proposals for the future. 3 In short,
close corporation participants talk to each other and listen to
each other. Through this continuous interaction, they actively
shape the terms of their relationship. Thus, whatever difficulties
the nexus of contracts approach may present for publicly traded
corporations, it seems eminently well-suited for owner-managed
close corporations. Certainly, it is more realistic than the traditional approach, which views managers as selfless servants and
shareholders as powerless beneficiaries of the managers' services. It is fair to say, therefore, that the express and implied expectations and understandings of owner-managers should be the
basic source of their relative rights and obligations.
The following section examines, in detail, the expectations
and understandings of two types of corporate shareholders: the
passive investor in publicly traded corporations and the active
participant in a close corporation. Before undertaking that examination, two caveats should be borne in mind. First, the law is
unavoidably obliged to infer shareholders' expectations and un41 Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS:

55, 60 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds.
1985); Victor Brudney, CorporateGovernance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1411 (1985).
Advocates of the contract theory respond to this objection by arguing that, in
purchasing shares, shareholders implicitly agree to all provisions of a corporation's
articles of incorporation, including those that might limit the managers' fiduciary
duties. Thus, by investing their money elsewhere, shareholders could refuse to accept such provisions. By voting with their feet, shareholders eventually force managers to accept the fiduciary duties that the shareholders want. EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 6-7.
42 See Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering Within Partnerships,41 U. MIAMI L. REV.
425 (1987).
4 3 Id.
THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS
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derstandings. Second, in drawing inferences about their expectations, the law will inevitably be guided by a particular vision of
what motivates the reasonable shareholder.
The contract among shareholders and managers of a corporation is a long-term, relational contract, rather than a discrete
transaction.44 Therefore, the contract is necessarily incomplete;
the parties cannot engage in explicit bargaining over many aspects of their interaction because they cannot foresee every possible contingency that might befall their venture.45 As a result,
courts must devise rules to govern the parties' rights and obligations when disputes arise between them. In turn, the role of the
law will be not merely to enforce the parties' agreement, but also
to impose upon them rights and obligations to which they have
not, in fact, agreed.
To fill the gaps in these incomplete contracts, a court might
simply allocate losses and gains among the parties according to
the court's own notions of fairness or equity-an approach which
suppresses the intentions and expectations of the parties themselves. 46 Alternatively, a court might engage in "hypothetical
bargaining ' 47 and seek to devise rules which the parties themselves would have chosen had it occurred to them to bargain
about the issue that now divides them. 48 To call such a gap-filling approach "hypothetical bargaining," however, is something
44 The literature on relational contracts is extensive. See, e.g.,

IAN R. MACNEIL,
AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L.

THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT:

(1980); Robert E. Scott,
(1987); Subha Narasimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracting, and the
Bargain Principle, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1123 (1986); Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract:
What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 483; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and
Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL.L. REV. 261 (1985); Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract:
Internal and External, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 340 (1983); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981); Ian R. Macneil,
The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974).
45 Hillman, supra note 42, at 435; see also Oliver E. Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19J. ECON. LIT. 1537, 1545 (1981) (our computational and experiential limitations necessarily result in incomplete contracting).
46 See Macey, supra note 35, at 14-17 (discussing a court's use of the "fairness
doctrine" to resolve insider trading allegations).
47 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 79-85 (3d ed. 1986);
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/EnablingBalance in CorporateLaw: An Essay on the
Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1622-23 (1989).
48 For an economic analysis of gap-filling default rules, see Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
YALE L.J. 87 (1989). For a discussion of other bases for fashioning gap-filling default rules, see Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 505-11 (1989).
REV. 2005
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of a misnomer because its ideal of enforcing the parties' "bargain" can never be achieved.
Often, parties fail to negotiate a rule because they disagree
over what the rule should be. Then, instead of abandoning the
project, they opt to continue with their investment with the hope
that the issue will never arise. When the issue does arise, a court
may impose obligations that at least one of the parties has previously rejected at the ex ante stage of the relationship. Even where
there are other reasons for the parties' failure to choose a rule,
such as a desire to reduce bargaining costs or a failure to foresee
the issue, 49 a court cannot know what rule the parties would have
chosen ex ante. The court must, rather, impose rights and obligations on the parties which it believes reasonablepersons similarly situated would have adopted. Inevitably, the parties are bound, not
by virtue of their voluntary consent, but by a third party's conception of what is reasonable under the circumstances.
To fashion rights and obligations upon which "reasonable"
co-venturers would agree, courts must develop a workable model
of the intentions and preferences of the reasonable participant in
a close corporation. That such a person is a holder of a residual
claim reveals little about her expectations. No single set of expectations can be attributable to all types of residual claimants.
Shareholders of close corporations and of publicly traded corporations, as well as partners of small egalitarian partnerships and
of large, centrally managed partnerships, are all residual claimants. The shareholder of a publicly traded corporation, however,
is a passive investor with no managerial role in the firm.5 ° The
non-managing partner of a large, centrally managed firm is essentially an employee with profit-sharing rights and unlimited liability. 5 ' The partner of a small egalitarian partnership is an
owner-manager whose role is that of both residual claimant and
49 Professor Hillman has delineated a number of factors, unique to close corporations and partnerships, that inhibit the parties' adoption of rules ex ante. First,
persons in the process of forming a small business are reluctant to obtain legal
counsel, who might raise issues that they had not considered. Second, parties who
do seek legal counsel often go to general practitioners because they are cheaper
and because lawyers specializing in corporate law often do not take small clients,
and therefore may not receive very good advice. Third, the parties resist focusing
on potential problems at the formation stage, when the need for cooperation and
willingness to contribute to the enterprise is crucial. Hillman, supra note 42, at 43539.
50 See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
51 See Hillman, supra note 42, at 441-42. Professor Hillman posits that newly
appointed partners in law firms cannot negotiate the partnership terms. Rather, he
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manager. Each of these types of residual claimants has distinctive expectations about the four salient aspects of her participation: her reasons for investing in the enterprise and for divesting
from it; the available means of realizing a return on her investment; the governance of the firm; and the agency costs and
mechanisms for reducing such costs that the investment entails.
What of the close corporation shareholder's understandings
about these matters? To pursue that question, this article addresses a paradigmatic close corporation -in which all of the
shareholders intend to be active in management. In such a firm,
the number of shareholders will necessarily be quite small 52 and
there cannot be an active market for its shares.53 For the most
part, its participants will have the same expectations as partners
of a small, egalitarian general partnership.54 This definition of
the close corporation is narrower than others that have been offered.55 It excludes a range of corporations that are neither close
argues: "[they have] only two choices: (1) [they] can sign [the agreement]; or (2)
[they].can find another job. Inevitably, [they] will sign." Id.
A striking example of the position of non-managing partners in large firms can
be seen in the 1988 bankruptcy of the New York-based megafirm of Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson & Casey. The bankruptcy judge
referred to the non-managing partners as "mushroom partners" because they were
"kept in the dark and fed manure" about the firm's actual financial condition and
performance. Rita Henley Jensen, Final Act Unwritten in Finley Drama; Financial Uncertainty Plagues Ex-Partners, NAT'L L.J.,Jan. 23, 1989, at 1, 22. In allocating personal
liability for firm debts among the partners, the bankruptcy trustee took into account
the powerlessness of the mushroom partners. Rita Henley Jensen, Finley Plan Unveiled 3 Years After Split, Creditors Would Get 30 Cents on the Dollar, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 25,
1991, at 1, 28.
52 In a corporation with, for example, 35 shareholders, all of the shareholders
cannot have a realistic expectation of being involved in management.
53 Often, shareholder agreements restrict the free transferability of shares precisely because all of the shareholders are expected to be active in management and
want the right to select those with whom they will work. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
supra note 14, at 229. Such agreements effectively preclude any market that might
otherwise have developed for the corporation's shares. Even where there is no
such agreement, an active market for the firm's shares will not develop easily because owner-managers invest for the long term and are ordinarily unwilling to sell
their shares. When a shareholder does want to sell, he must find a buyer who is
willing to incur substantial information costs about the firm's financial condition
and prospects, and who can fit in as a colleague of the remaining shareholders.
The pool of potential buyers, therefore, will be extremely small.
54 That is not to say that close corporations are analogous to all partnerships.
For a discussion of the partnership analogy, see infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
55 A popular judicial definition of the close corporation describes it as "typified
by: (1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock;
and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in the management, direction
and operations of the corporation." Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng-
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(as defined here) nor publicly traded. In such intermediate firms,
some of the shareholders will be owner-managers, others will be
passive investors and still others may be non-managerial employees. Their understandings will differ both from those that develop in the publicly traded corporation and from those in the
owner-managed corporation described here. While such firms
are not considered in this article, it is hoped that the discussion
in the following section will provide a useful framework for some
future analysis of the express and implied contracts within
56
them.

B.

Expectations and Understandings Within Firms

The great bulk of corporate law scholarship is concerned
with publicly traded corporations. As a result, the prototypical
residual claimant described in such literature is the shareholder
57
of the publicly traded corporation-that is, the passive investor.
In this section, the expectations of passive investors are compared and contrasted with those of owner-managers of small
firms. On the basis of that comparison, it is argued that the traditional rules of fiduciary duty and of the right to dissolve the
enterprise, while appropriate for passive investors, are inappropriate for owner-managers.
land, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975) (emphasis added). Such a definition encompasses corporations in which some shareholders may be passive investors and
is, therefore, too broad to permit an exploration of the expectations that develop in
close, personal relationships.
Statutory definitions of the close corporation are similarly overbroad. Under
some state statutes, a close corporation may have a great many shareholders. See,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342(a)(1) (1991) (maximum of 30 shareholders).
Under the Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement, however, there may be
as many as fifty shareholders-too many for all of them to have a realistic expectation of being involved in management. 4 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN., MODEL
STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPP. § 3(b)(3d ed. 1985).
56 While this article argues that owner-managed close corporations should be
dissolvable at the will of any shareholder, such a rule may be problematic for corporations that are closely held, but in which there are passive as well as active investors. Consider, for example, the entrepreneur who sells corporate stock to one or a
few investors, while retaining the majority of the stock for himself, and where everyone agrees that the entrepreneur will operate and manage the business and that
the other investors will be passive. In such firms, the shareholders' expectations
will surely differ from those that develop in owner-managed firms and a dissolution-at-will rule may be inappropriate for them. Some commentators who object to
dissolution at will for close corporations have precisely this type of firm in mind.
See Thompson, supra note 7; Hillman, supra note 16.
57 See, e.g., Klein, supra note 31, at 1551 (describing shareholders as passive
investors).
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1. Passive Investors
(a) The decision to buy or to sell
The shareholder of a publicly traded corporation invests
money, as opposed to goods or services, with a view to receiving
money, as opposed to steady employment or associational benefits, in return. 58 At the outset, the shareholder faces an extremely
diverse array of other passive investment opportunities encompassing not only stock in other public-issue corporations, but
also interests in mutual funds and debt securities of corporations,
financial institutions and governmental authorities. From the
shareholder's point of view, the corporate shares are fungible
with all other potential passive investment, differentiated only according to the shareholder's own risk preferences and portfolio
needs. If the investor chooses to buy shares in a publicly traded
corporation rather than, for example, U.S. Treasury bonds, it is
simply because the investor believes, taking her risk preference
into account, that she will realize more money from stock ownership in that company than from any other money-returning
investments.
The shareholder of a publicly traded corporation also invests
with the knowledge that she can exit the enterprise easily,
cheaply and at any time, simply by selling her shares through a
stockbroker.5 9 The shareholder may use that option because she
needs cash or because she objects to a particular action taken by
management. 60 More likely, the shareholder sells when she calculates that she would realize a higher rate of return on some
other investment.
(b)

Return on investment

The shareholder of a publicly traded corporation may realize
a return on her investment in either of two ways: directly, by a
distribution of dividends, or indirectly, by an increase in the market value of her shares. 6 ' As a passive investor, she has no expectation of receiving payments through a side contract with the
58 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 4; Robert W. Hillman, Power Shared
and Power Denied: A Look at ParticipatoryRights in the Management of General Partnership,
1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 865, 887.
59 Fama, supra note 32, at 291; see also Henry G. Manne, Our Two CorporationSystems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 263-64 (1967) (changing circumstances,

within the corporation and in the investor's personal life, lend themselves to the
concept of ready liquidation of an investor's interest).
60 'See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 31, at 788.
61 Manne, supra note 59, at 273.
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firm, such as a lease of property to the corporation or an employment contract entitling her to a salary. In general, because both
dividend distributions and share value depend upon the corporation's profitability, the shareholders' rational preference is for
the managers to operate the firm for maximum profit. There are
exceptions, of course. When the prospect for a takeover arises,
the shareholders may prefer that managers sell the business for
the highest price, even if that means the business will thereafter
be broken up. Apart from such major restructurings, however,
the shareholders' return on investment is maximized to the extent that the firm's profit is maximized.62
(c)

Governance

The governance structure of the publicly traded corporation
enables shareholders to maximize their return on investment.
Shareholders understand that the firm's profit, and thus their return on investment, could not be maximized if they had more
than a minimal voice in corporate decision-making. One reason,
of course, is that the sheer number of shareholders would make
their involvement unmanageable. 63 Moreover, many shareholders have too small a stake in any one publicly traded corporation
to make it worthwhile to incur the costs of becoming involved in
decision-making for the firm.' Equally important, shareholders
justifiably believe that the managers of a publicly traded corporation possess professional managerial expertise which the shareholders themselves lack.65 Corporate managers achieve their
positions through a competitive market for managerial labor.66
That competitive process increases the likelihood that top corporate posts will be filled by knowledgeable, competent individuals.
It is therefore likely that corporate managers know better than
shareholders what strategies and policies will maximize the firm's
profitability, and thereby maximize the shareholders' return.
62 For an elaboration of the difficulties involved in identifying the shareholders'
welfare, see Hu, supra note 34.
63 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 31, at 788; Fama, supra note 32, at 291-92.

64 See Fama, supra note 32, at 293; see also Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 3 1, at

788.
For a discussion on the emergence of the professional corporate manager, see
D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND (1977). For a discussion of the emergence of the modern, multidivisional corporation directed by professional corporate managers, see Williamson, supra note 45, at 1555-56.
66 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 4; Fama, supra note 32, at 292.
65

ALFRED
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Agency costs

In the publicly traded corporation, agency costs are defined
as the sum of shareholder losses due to the managers' failure to
maximize shareholder wealth and the costs of monitoring and
bonding to reduce such failures.6 7 Agency costs can be reduced
through a number of extra-legal mechanisms.
One mechanism to reduce managerial shirking and stealing
is monitoring. Shareholders can scrutinize the managers'
processes and outcomes for signs that the managers are not devoting their efforts to the maximization of the firm's profits and
the shareholders' wealth.6 8 State laws, as well as federal securities laws and regulations, exist to facilitate such monitoring.
Under state law, shareholders are entitled to inspect corporate
books and records.6 9 Under federal law, managers are required
to report publicly on numerous aspects of their activities. They
must, for example, periodically report the corporation's financial
condition and results,7 ° and reveal transactions between managers and the corporation as well as the managers' trading in the
corporation's stock. 7 ' Firms may, in addition, use professional
monitors, such as independent auditors, to report to the shareholders. The exchange on which a firm's stock is traded, as well
as the Securities and Exchange Commission, also provide a monitoring function.
Monitoring is costly, however, and therefore is not the principal mechanism to minimize agency costs in the publicly traded
corporation. Rather, incentives, such as promises of reward and
threats of reprisal, induce managers to maximize firm profits,
thus serving the shareholders' interests. Linking management
bonuses to the corporation's profitability, or including stock and
stock options in managers' compensation packages, directly
aligns the managers' interest with that of the shareholders, encouraging managers to maximize the firm's profit and stock
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 31, at 308-09.
Shareholders do not necessarily perform such monitoring themselves. Frequently they rely on professional securities analysts to do so. Jensen & Meckling,
supra note 31, at 354. In other agency relationships, monitoring may include imposing specific controls on the agent's behavior as well as reviewing their conduct.
Id. at 308 n.9. In the publicly traded corporation, however, the shareholders are
not involved in the manager's daily operations or activities.
69 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1991); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1501, 1600
to 1601 (West 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 624 (McKinney 1986).
70 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1988); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13a (1991).
71 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d (1991).
67
68
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value. In addition, the markets for managerial labor 72 and for
corporate control 73 lead managers to maximize corporate profits.
The market for managerial talent rewards successful managers
with employment opportunities in prestigious and well-paid positions. The market for corporate control threatens them with hostile takeover, and the resultant loss of their positions, if they fail
to maximize the shareholders' return on investment. 4
These incentives lead managers to enhance the shareholders' wealth by appealing to the managers' own self-interest. It
should be noted, however, that managers may also be motivated
to serve the shareholders' interests simply by a sense of responsibility or commitment to duty. Dean Manning has described the
response of outside corporate directors to corporate difficulties
in just those terms: "If the hurricane comes, the board members
will typically respond energetically out of their sense of responsibility, pouring time, energy, study, attention, and initiative into
the company's affairs, sometimes
to the point of temporarily as75
suming full executive control.

SUMMARY

In the publicly traded corporation, the relationship between
passive investor and manager is thoroughly impersonal. Indeed,
because shares are traded daily, the identities of shareholders
72

See Fama, supra note 32, at 292.

73 See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110 (1965); cf. Fama, supra note 31, at 295 ("Manne's approach, in which the

control of management relies primarily on the expensive mechanism of an outside
takeover, offers little comfort.... [TIhe primary disciplining of managers comes
through managerial labor markets ... with the market for outside takeovers providing discipline of last resort.").
74 These market mechanisms are not perfect. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate
Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 579 (1990)
(arguing that the market discipline theory is flawed because most corporate executive officers are rarely involuntarily removed and that target corporate managers
can create large transaction costs for hostile bidders, creating takeover disincentives and thus protecting the manager from market discipline). Unlike legal sanctions, market responses to managerial misbehavior neither directly punish nor
demand direct compensation from an errant manager for his misdeed. Rather,
market responses guide firm managers to work for the shareholders' benefit. This
inducement occurs only in a generalized and indirect way, and only over the long
term. An inefficiently managed firm will not necessarily become a takeover target;
indeed, sometimes a takeover is motivated not by the management's failings, but by
its successes. Similarly, not all errant managers will find themselves unable to advance up the corporate ladder, while some good managers may find themselves
stymied.
75 Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention:
Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAw. 1477, 1492 (1984).
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from one day to the next are unknown to the managers and generally unimportant.76 Moreover, the extreme transience of the
relationship, resulting from daily trading of shares, does not affect the stability of the firm itself. Nameless, faceless shareholders buy into and sell out of the firm without altering the basic
terms of the corporate bargain, which gives managers dominion
over the corporate assets in return for their undertaking to maximize the shareholders' return on investment.
Thus, shareholders and managers in the publicly traded corporation are not directly connected in relationship, but rather are
linked through the medium of the market. In such a context,
separation and self-interest will predominate. A sense of responsibility on the part of the managers is present, but it is not responsibility in the sense of responsiveness to the needs of
others; 7 7 it is, rather, a personal commitment to contractual obligation. The following section will explore the quite different relationships in owner-managed firms.
2.

Owner-Managers

It should be noted that the following description of ownermanagers applies equally to owner-managed firms that are organized as corporations and to those operating in the partnership form. To say that owner-managed firms are alike, however,
is not intended as a wholesale endorsement of the view that close
corporations are analogous to partnerships. 7' The terms "close
corporation" and "partnership" describe legal constructs, each
of which embraces a wide variety of entrepreneurial activity.
Thus, for example, the corporation in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing
Home, Inc., 79 is directly analogous to the paradigm partnership
76 Of course, the identity of major shareholders often will be important to the
managers, and must be reported to them. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d),
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988).
77 See Carol Gilligan, Remapping the Moral Domain: New Images of the Self in Relationship, in RECONSTRUCTING INDIVIDUALISM: AUTONOMY, INDIVIDUALITY, AND THE
SELF IN WESTERN THOUGHT 237, 241 (Thomas C. Heller et al. eds., 1986).
78 There is an ongoing debate over whether close corporations are analogous to

partnerships. See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 16, at 61-68 (analogous); EASTERBROOK
& FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 249-52 (analogous in some, but not all, respects);
Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 15, at 2 (analogous). Compare Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975) (embracing the
partnership analogy) and Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 498 A.2d 642 (Md.
1985) (criticizing the partnership analogy).
79 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). In Wilkes, four men formed a corporation to
run and operate a nursing home facility, with the understanding that all four would
be actively involved in the management and decision-making process.
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envisioned by the U.P.A.: a small firm, organized along egalitarian lines, and all of whose owners are expected to be engaged in
management.8 ° The Wilkes corporation (or, for that matter, the
U.P.A.'s paradigm) is not at all analogous, however, to a large,
centrally managed partnership such as the multi-state or multinational law firm. 8 ' In other words, some, but not all, closelyheld corporations can be analogized to some, but not all, partnerships. As noted earlier, this article addresses those close corporations that happen to be analogous to the small, egalitarian
partnerships envisioned by the U.P.A. 8 2
(a)

The decision to buy or sell

Like the passive inyestor, the owner-manager of a firm invests money in the enterprise. She also invests labor and may
contribute assets (such as machinery, equipment, or interests in
land or buildings). Moreover, just as her investment in the firm
is not limited to money, the motivation for making the investment is more complicated than a desire for money.
In addition to a steady income, the owner-manager anticipates that the venture will provide psychological payoffs. Some
of these payoffs consist of the fulfillment of what Professor Hill83
man has called the "dignity interests" of owner-managers,
which include the pleasure of being one's own boss, the feeling
of satisfaction in creating a viable enterprise and even the excitement of taking a substantial risk.8 4 Dignity interests might also
be said to include the owner-managers' aspiration to the folkhero stature of the small. business person, 5 and an identification
with the hero's "idealized virtues-individualism, energy, sense
of purpose, hands-on ownership, courage to risk everything to be
captain of his own destiny, [and] resourcefulness against overwhelming odds ...

."6 Another psychological payoff may be

described as the fulfillment of the owner-manager's relational inHiUman, supra note 42, at 432.
For a discussion of such partnerships, see Robert W. Hillman, Law Firms and
Their Partners:The Law and Ethics of Grabbingand Leaving, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1988).
82 See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
83 Hillman, supra note 58, at 887.
84 The risk of failure of the small business enterprise is notoriously high. See,
e.g., Rowland Berthoff, Independenceand Enterprise. Small Business in the American Dream,
in SMALL BuSINESS IN AMERICAN LIFE 41 (Stuart W. Bruchey ed. 1980) ("study after
study since 1930 has warned that failure within a few years is almost certain for
many of them in the absence of relevant experience and adequate capital").
85 Id. at 44.
86 STEVEN SOLOMON, SMALL BUSINESS USA 183 (1986).
80
81
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terest, or interest in "connectedness," in that she looks forward
to working together with trusted colleagues to build the business.
Part of what the owner-manager expects (or hopes) to achieve is
the establishment of a successful relationship with her
colleagues.a8

The existence of these complex motivations for investment
in an owner-managed firm makes such an investment unique. It
is not fungible with the many passive investment opportunities
offered by publicly traded corporations or limited partnerships.
Nor is a prospective owner-manager faced with a myriad of small
business investment opportunities because such entities are
formed by groups of people who know and trust each other. A
stranger to the group, even one who might possess valuable
property or expertise, will not ordinarily be invited to participate
in the enterprise.8 8
Accordingly, the prospective owner-manager's investment
decision will not be based solely on the expected monetary return from the close corporation (although that will obviously be a
factor in her decision), and the close corporation opportunity
cannot be directly compared with other potential investments.
Crucial to her investment decision will be whether she can get
along with the prospective co-venturers, whether their management styles and business philosophy are compatible, whether
their goals are similar and whether they will maintain an essential
trust and respect for one another.89 If the owner-manager ultimately agrees to invest in the close corporation, the decision will
not be solely because she believes it will produce more money
than some other investment.
Inasmuch as the owner-manager is motivated to invest by
more than monetary concerns, she considers her investment to
be long-term. The owner-manager neither enters nor exits the
investment casually, unlike a passive investor who shifts capital
by the simple expedient of telephoning a broker and paying a
modest brokerage fee. It does not follow, however, that the
owner-manager expects the investment to be permanent. On the
contrary, it is routine for co-venturers to sell their business for a
87 For a discussion of the owner-manager's means of achieving these hoped-for
returns, see infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
88 See F. Hodge O'Neal and Thomas D. Magill, California'sNew Close Corporation
Legislation, 23 UCLA L. REV. 1155, 1167 (1976) (personal relationship usually antedates the formation of a close corporation).
89 See I F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 2:02 (2d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1991).
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variety of reasons. The venture's continued success may require
an expansion that is beyond the sellers' ability or inclination to
handle. The owner-managers may even be ready to retire. If
they cannot find anyone willing to buy the firm as a going concern, the venturers can divest by dissolving and liquidating the
assets. Frequently, one owner-manager may sell her interest in
the enterprise to the others because the seller is ready to retire,
while the others want to continue the business.
Unlike the passive investor's sale of stock, the owner-manager's sale of her interest usually has a direct impact on the other
owner-managers because the others ordinarily are the only market for the seller's interest. 90 The other owner-managers may
utilize their personal assets to buy the seller's interest or they
may cause the firm to use its available cash or credit to redeem
the seller's interest. To say that the remaining owner-managers
will be affected by a buyout or a redemption, of course, is not to
say that the purchasers will be impoverished while the seller is
enriched. The owner-managers who buy the seller's interest take
something in exchange, namely a larger residual claim in a going
business. The same result is obtained when the firm's cash or
credit is used to redeem the seller's interest: the remaining
owner-managers receive a larger claim in the going business. It
is true that the firm itself receives no "value" in exchange for the
redemption, but it is a mistake to conclude that the firm is therefore transferring wealth to the withdrawing owner-manager at
the expense of those who remain. A redemption enriches both
selling and remaining participants because the seller is enriched
with cash, while the remaining participants
are enriched with
91
larger shares of the going concern.
90 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. See also Wilkes v. Springside Nursing
Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Mass. 1976) ("there is by definition no ready
market for minority stock in a close corporation"); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975) ("No outsider would knowingly assume the position of the disadvantaged minority.").
91 To be sure, a redemption will entail transaction costs that may or may not be
shared between the seller and the remaining participants. In addition, the remaining participants may distribute the benefits of the seller's share unevenly, as was the
case in Donahue. There, before the corporation redeemed the seller's shares, the
minority shareholder owned 20% of the corporation's stock but received no dividends and the majority shareholders refused to buy the minority's interest for an
acceptable price. After the redemption, the minority shareholder owned 25% of
the stock, but still received no dividends and still could not persuade the majority
to buy her stock for an acceptable price. The remaining shareholders (the seller's
three children) captured the full benefit of the redemption because, once the selling shareholder was gone, they split the profits three ways instead of four. The
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(b) Return on investment
As discussed earlier, the owner-manager anticipates two
types of return on her investment in the firm: money and psychological satisfaction. 92 A monetary return on investment may occur through direct profit distributions from the enterprise, in the
form of salary, other side payments or dividends. Unlike the passive investor, the owner-manager cannot rely on a secondary securities market to cash in on an increase in the value of her
shares. The owner-manager may, nonetheless, realize capital
gain on her investment by finding a third party to buy her shares
or more frequently, by selling her shares to the other participants
or to the firm itself. A prerequisite to such a sale, however, is the
co-operation of the other participants. 93 By contrast, the existence of a secondary market allows the passive investor in a publicly traded firm to cash out unilaterally.
The non-monetary returns on investment that the ownermanager anticipates-the psychological satisfactions-are realized largely through involvement in management. A participant's dignity interests, in being her own boss, in participating in
a folk ideal, etc., are served directly by having managerial status
and prerogative. A participant's interest in "connectedness" is
also fulfilled by the participant's involvement in management,
although mere status and managerial prerogative are often insufficient to fulfill that interest. That interest is met by the participant's co-operative engagement in management with her
colleagues. The owner-managers' ability to achieve a successful
collegial relationship depends, at least in part, upon their ability
to engage in "caring," in the sense elaborated upon by Nel Noddings.94 Specifically, Noddings asserts, caring involves both action and response. Each party in a caring relationship is
Donahue court viewed the redemption of stock as a form of selective dividend from
which the minority shareholder was wrongly excluded. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 519.
The harm to the minority, however, stemmed from the majority's exploitation of
the minority's position, not from the redemption in and of itself.
92 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
93 Under the Uniform Partnership Act, for example, a partner may transfer her
"interest in the partnership"-the right to receive distributions-to anyone without
the other partners' consent, but may not transfer the right to participate in management without the others' unanimous consent. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 18(g), 27.
Similarly, shareholders of close corporations may impose restrictions on the free
transferability of shares with the intended effect that a shareholder may not sell to a

third party without the consent of the other shareholders. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 202 (1991); CAL. CORP. CODE § 418 (West 1990); 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT
ANN.
94

§ 6.27 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1991).
See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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receptive to the needs and desires of the other, and, simultaneously, each party recognizes and spontaneously reponds to the
other's receptivity. 95 That caring, so understood, may be an aspect of commercial relationships is rarely recognized in the legal
literature, and for good reason. The law does not become involved in such relationships until they have become so dysfunctional that the parties cannot resolve their disputes privately. At
that point, the parties' capacity for caring is noticeably absent.
Before such breakdowns occur, however, mutual caring is undoubtedly an aspect of the relationships within owner-managed
firms and constitutes part of the psychic payoff for investment in
such firms.
(c) Governance
The governance structure of the publicly traded corporation, marked by broad discretion in the hands of managers and
passivity on the part of shareholders, is a means whereby shareholders of such entities maximize their return on investment. 96
In the owner-managed firm, the governance structure-active
participation in management by the owners-is both a means to
an end, and an end in itself. As discussed later,9" the participants' involvement in management is a means for reducing certain agency costs because it allows the participants to monitor
each other, thus reducing shirking and stealing. In addition, one
of the goals of the owner-manager is to participate in
management.
For partnerships, the owner-manager's expectation of participating in management is explicitly recognized and protected by
the U.P.A. Under section 18 of the U.P.A., the partners have
equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership
business.9 8 This management right is so important that an attempt to exclude a partner from involvement in management
constitutes grounds for judicial dissolution of a term partnership. 99 In Steckroth v. Ferguson,l00 for example, the court granted
95 See NODDINGS, supra note 23, at 78 ("A caring relation requires the engrossment and motivational displacement of the one-caring, and it requires the recognition and spontaneous risponse of the cared-for.").
96 See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
97 See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
98 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 18(e).
99 See Vangel v. Vangel, 254 P.2d 919, 923-24 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953); Owen
v. Cohen, 119 P.2d 713, 715-16 (Cal. 1941); Steckroth v. Ferguson, 274 N.W. 792,
793-94 (Mich. 1937).
100 274 N.W. 792 (Mich. 1937).
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dissolution of a term partnership because of one partner's continuing attempt to exclude the other from management.
Agency law principles, coupled with the partners' personal
liability for firm debts, provide a partial explanation for the
courts' zealous protection of partners' management rights.10
Because any partner may incur obligations that are binding on
the firm, and all partners are liable for firm debts, each partner
should have a voice in the incurrence of firm debt.10 2 There are,
however, two additional considerations underlying the right of
partners to participate in firm management. The first, elaborated
upon by Professor Hillman, is that each partner has a "dignity
interest" that is invaded when her co-partners refuse to respect
her stature as a contributing member of the partnership.10 3 The
Steckroth court, for example, alluded to this dignity interest in
commenting: "One partner cannot continually minimize the
other and bring him into disrepute or contempt without destroying the basic status upon which a successful partnership rests.""°'
The second consideration underlying partners' management
rights can be discerned when the partners' relationship is viewed
as a personal one in which the parties are concerned for each
other's welfare as well as their own. Nel Noddings has observed
that a crucial aspect of such relationships is responsiveness-that
is, each party recognizes the other's concern, or "caring," and
responds to it.' °5 In the context of the owner-managed firm, a
partner's attempt to exclude a colleague from management by
withholding information or refusing to consult with the colleague-in short, by ignoring him-can be understood as a failure of response, which represents a departure from the parties'
original understanding that they would work together for mutual
benefit.
It may well be that a participant's failure to respond is a root
cause of at least some instances of dissension and litigation in
close corporations. 0 6 In some cases, for example, one shareholder is perceived to be incompetent by her co-owners, who
may try to exclude her from management and then refuse to
share corporate income on the ground that she is not bearing her
101 Hillman, supra note 58, at 884.
Id.
103 Id.
104 Steckroth, 274 N.W. at 794.
1o5 NODDINGS, supra note 23, at 4, 65, 86.
106 The description of causes of dissention in close corporations is drawn from 1
O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 89, ch. 2.
102
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fair share of the burden. 107 Alternatively, a shareholder may simply be autocratic; while not specifically viewing her colleagues as
incompetent, she operates the business as a sole proprietorship,
without consulting her co-owners.' 0 8 The participants who are
excluded, not consulted, and unacknowledged by their co-venturers may ultimately engage in actions that give rise to charges
and countercharges of wrongdoing.
Meiselman v. Meiselman 109 is an illustrative case. Two brothers, Michael and Ira Meiselman, owned all of the shares of various corporations that comprised the family business, having
received them from their father, the founder of the companies.
Both Ira and his father lacked confidence in Michael's abilities.
That lack of confidence led Meiselman pere to give the majority
interest to Ira and it led Ira, eventually, to exclude Michael from
strategic decision-making for the business. Ira excluded Michael
by turning over the management of the jointly owned corporations to a corporation owned solely by Ira. Notably, neither Ira
nor his father took the step of ousting Michael from the business
altogether-a step that a person solely interested in maximizing
profits and convinced that Michael did not contribute to profits
would surely have taken. While the senior Meiselman wanted Ira
to have decisive managerial power, the father still wanted
Michael to have a stake in the business. Similarly, although Ira
concentrated management responsibilities in an entity in which
Michael had no stake (and therefore no possibility of acquiring
managerial prerogative), Ira nonetheless made Michael an employee of the management corporation so that Michael had ajob
and an income.
The job and its income were not enough for Michael. Indeed, Ira's creation of the management corporation was the catalyst for Michael's initiation of what became an extraordinarily
long and expensive litigation. Michael summed up his grievance
poignantly:
107 See, e.g., Schwartz v. Marien, 351 N.Y.S.2d 216 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (corporate policy limiting sales of corporate stock to "active" employees, with the direct
result of disenfranchising the inactive majority shareholder, is suspect); Godley v.
Crandall & Godley Co., 105 N.E. 818 (N.Y. 1914) (granting special dividends to
only the "best and trusted employees"). See generally, 1 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra
note 89, §§ 2:03 & 2:04 (discussing the tensions and rifts created by an inactive
shareholder and by the death of an active shareholder).
108 See Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969); see
also 1 'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 89, § 2:07 (discussing the effect on relationships when an autocracy emerges in a close corporation).
109 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983).
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My brother had the majority of stock in [the family corporations] before this management contract. As to whether he had
the final say in the control of [the corporations], that is the
point. He might have been the final say, but when [the management corporation] started, I lost all say-so because he
wouldn't listen to anybody." 0
It was Ira's refusal to "listen to anybody" that triggered the series of
moves and countermoves which ultimately resulted in the brothers'
dissociation. Michael sued Ira in an effort to claim an ownership
interest in the management corporation. In response, Ira fired
Michael from the business and Michael, in turn, sued to dissolve all
of the jointly owned companies."'
(d)

Agency costs

As with publicly traded corporations, shirking and stealing
represent agency costs in the owner-managed firm. A participant
may neglect her managerial tasks, leaving fewer profits for all to
share, or may divert firm income to herself, leaving less for her
colleagues to share. The mechanisms that reduce agency costs in
the owner-managed firm can usefully be grouped according to
the human motivations to which they appeal.
First, monitoring and providing incentives are mechanisms
that appeal to the self-interest of the owner-managers. The coventurers may protect their own interests by monitoring each
other's work to detect and punish the others' self-interested
shirking and stealing. Whereas monitoring is costly in the publicly traded corporation, in the owner-managed firm it is relatively cheap. Because each participant is active in management,
each has access to current information about the condition of the
business and about the other participants' activities. 1 2
A number of the incentives that, relying on managers' selfinterest, operate to reduce agency costs in publicly traded corporations are not available to owner-managed firms. Owner-managers are generally unaffected by the market for managerial
labor, the market for corporate control and the secondary securities market. On the other hand, the alignment of the owner-managers' interests provides an incentive to maximize the firm's
profits so that there will be more for all to share. That incentive
110 Id. at 555.

1ll The court ultimately found that Ira had breached a fiduciary duty to his
brother. Id. at 571.
112 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 232-33.
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may be quite weak, however, for any participant who finds that
she can capture as much or more wealth by diverting firm income
to herself, instead of working harder to generate greater firm
profits and sharing those profits with her colleagues.
Another cost-reducing mechanism that appeals to the participants' self-interest (and which is available to some, but not all,
owner-managed firms) is the prerogative of each participant to
withdraw from the enterprise at will."

3

In firms whose partici-

pants are entitled to withdraw at will, shirking and stealing are
straightforwardly reduced. The participant tempted to steal from
her co-venturers knows that, if discovered, the co-venturers may
unceremoniously leave, taking their capital stakes with themthus leaving the thief in a worse position. Similarly, majority
shareholders tempted to retain all corporate profits know that if
they do so, the minority shareholders may take their capital elsewhere, which may be more costly to the majority than sharing
profits.
Motivations other than self-interest, however, are also at
work in the owner-managed firm and some mechanisms that reduce agency costs can be understood as relying on such motives.
Conscience, for example, or commitment to a principle of keeping promises, may induce an owner-manager to forego the opportunity to shirk her duties or to steal." 14 In addition, some
researchers suggest that cooperation among individuals increases dramatically when the individuals are members of an
identifiable and interacting group."t 5 It is easy to see how partici-

pants' ability to cooperate increases firm profitability.
The
owner-managers can respond quickly and flexibly to the vicissitudes of their business. The allocation of tasks, performance requirements and the sharing of burdens can be constantly refined
in light of the firm's evolving needs and in light of the evolving
capabilities and desires of the participants. What is interesting
about the "group interest" research is it suggests that, because
the owner-managers form an identifiable group that engages in
I 13 The right to withdraw at will is not, of course, generally available to shareholders of close corporations because corporate statutes require that dissolution of
the entity be approved by a majority of the outstanding shares. See 2 MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. § 14.02 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1991). A number of states, however,
explicitly allow shareholders of statutory close corporations to contract around that
default rule. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 352 (1991); 4 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.,
MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPP. § 33 (3d ed. 1985).
114 Hillman, supra note 42, at 443 n.68.
115 Robyn M. Dawes et al., Cooperationfor the Benefit of Us-Not Me, or My Conscience,
in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 97, 108-09 (]aneJ. Mansbridge ed., 3d ed. 1990).
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reason to expect them to enpersonal interaction, there is good
6
cooperation."
vital
such
in
gage
Finally, it is likely that the participants in an owner-managed
firm refrain from shirking and stealing, not merely because it is in
their own interest to refrain, not merely in obedience to conscience and not merely out of "group interest," but also, simply
because they care about each other and about each other's welfare. When the participants are receptive to each other's goals
and interests, and mutually reponsive to each other's caring, cooperative or generous behavior, the result will be a greater willingness on the part of all to generate greater profits-and to
share those profits with each other.
SUMMARY

The nexus of contracts theory suggests that the expectations
and understandings of participants should be determinative of
their rights and obligations. Accordingly, corporate fiduciary
duty rules should be critiqued according to whether they further
or defeat the corporate participants' expectations. Part I of this
article has argued that the expectations of owner-managers differ
fundamentally from those of passive investors. Part II examines
the traditional law of corporate fiduciary duty, and the traditional
rules of voluntary corporate dissolution, and shows that the
traditional means operate, generally, to further expectations in
publicly traded corporations, but to defeat expectations in close
corporations.
PART II
CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND VOLUNTARY
DISSOLUTION

A.

Fiduciary Obligations and the Business Judgment Rule
1. Publicly Traded Corporations

Corporate managers owe fiduciary duties of loyalty and care
to the corporation and to shareholders." 7 The duty of care requires managers to have, at minimum, a general grasp of the corporation's business and its financial condition. The managers

must pay sufficient attention to the corporation's fortunes to no116 Id.
117 For a general description and discussion of corporate managers' fiduciary duties, see DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES
OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS (3d ed. 1990).
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tice obvious signals that problems exist and must adequately investigate those warning signs." l8 Their decisions must be based
on informed deliberation. The managers should understand the
likely impact of their action upon the corporation and its shareholders" 9 and, depending upon the circumstances, may be obligated to consider alternative courses of action as well.' 20 The
actual substance of the managers' decision is largely irrelevant to
the central question of whether the decision was made after appropriately careful deliberation.' 2 1 If so, then the duty of care
was not breached, even though the decision may have resulted in
losses.' 22 If not, then the duty of care was breached, even if the
corporation suffered no loss (although,
of course, liability would
23
not be imposed in such a case).

In theory, the managers' duty of loyalty prohibits them from
putting their own self-interest ahead of the corporation's interests. The duty of loyalty is not as sweeping as that statement suggests, however. Clearly, a corporate transaction in which a
manager has a conflicting interest may be challenged by a share118 Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920); Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses and Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974);
Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981).
119 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
120 Id. at 873; see also Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the
Boardroom after Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAw. 1, 5-6 (1985) (positing that, where directors' actions affect ownership of shares, they should be "more than usually alert,
deliberative, focused, prepared [and] counseled").
121 For an excellent discussion of the evolution of the legal standard imposed
upon corporate directors and how the directors make their decisions, see James A.
Cheek, III, Making OrdinaryBoard of Directors'Decisions, 12 ALI-ABA COURSE MATERIAL J. 65 (June 1988). For discussions of the application of the business judgment
rule, see Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40
Bus. LAw. 1437 (1985); Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care:Judicial
Avoidance of Standardsand Sanctions Through the BusinessJudgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV.
591 (1983). For a discussion of the business judgment rule, see infra notes 127-31
and accompanying text.
122 But see Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 699 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (bank directors
held liable for approving an arrangement that was "so improvident, so risky, so
unusual and unnecessary as to be contrary to fundamental conceptions of prudent
banking practice"). Some commentators strongly criticize the decision in Litwin,
while others suggest its significance is limited because it involved bank directors,
whose decisions and activities are more heavily regulated than those of non-bank
corporate directors. Compare Larry D. Soderquist, The Proper Standardfor Directors'
Negligence Liability, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 37 (1990) (criticizing Litwin) with Joseph
W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1968) (limiting Litwin).
123 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 173 (Tentative Draft No. 11, 1991) (hereinafter ALI,
PRINCIPLES); Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (no losses caused
by the defendant's neglect).
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holder and will be carefully scrutinized by the courts. 124 The interested manager must demonstrate to the court either that the
transaction was approved by disinterested and informed directors or shareholders, or that it was substantively "fair" to the corporation.125 Similarly, a manager may not enter into competition
against the corporation or exploit a business opportunity that the
corporation might pursue unless permitted
by disinterested and
2 6
informed directors or shareholders.1
As to transactions that do not involve a direct conflict of interest, however, courts generally defer to managerial decisions. 127 This "hands-off" stance is dictated by the business
judgment rule.' 28 Narrowly stated, the business judgment rule is
an evidentiary presumption that directors act in accordance with
their duty of care. 129 A shareholder complaining that the direcALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 123, § 5.02.
Id. § 5.02(a).
Id. § 5.05(a).
In addition to self-dealing transactions, there are two other types of managerial decisions-both of which pose a substantial danger of direct harm to the shareholders-in which courts have declined to give managers the full protection of the
business judgment rule. The first such decision is the adoption of a plan to ward
off or thwart a hostile takeover. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) ("When a board [of directors] addresses a pending takeover bid it has an obligation to determine whether the offer is in the best interests
of the corporation and its shareholders .... Because of the omnipresent specter
that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the
corporation and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial
examination at the threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule
may be conferred."); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1985) (when takeover and sale of the company becomes inevitable, the duty of the directors is to maximize the sale proceeds, not protect themselves from potential liability for failed defensive measures). Cf. Schnell v. ChrisCraft Indus., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971) (board's advancement of annual meeting
date, designed to thwart an insurgent group's proxy contest, held not protected by
the business judgment rule).
The second such decision that is not fully protected by the business judgment
rule is the appointment of a special litigation committee to take control of-and
dismiss-a shareholder derivative suit. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981) (committee's motion to dismiss a derivative suit will
be granted only if (1) the members of the committee are disinterested; (2) the committee's investigation of the charges against the directors was adequate; and (3) the
court, exercising its discretion, believes the dismissal is warranted in the best interests of the corporation).
128 For extensive discussions of the business judgment rule, see Alfred D. Mathewson, DecisionalIntegrity and the Business Judgment Rule: A Theory, 17 PEPP. L. REV.
879 (1990); BLOCK, supra note 117; Manning, supra note 120.
129 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). See also S. Samuel Arsht, The BusinessJudgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 97-100 (1979) (discussing the genesis of the business
judgment rule).
124
125
126
127
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tors acted without due care can rebut the presumption only by
proving gross negligence on the directors' part.130 In this narrow
sense, the business judgment rule cloaks the directors only with a
presumption of prudence and does not presume their loyalty.
The business judgment rule, however, is much more than this
modest evidentiary presumption. It is an effective bar to shareholder suits against directors' 3 ' and thus serves as the mechanism by which the strict differentiation between the shareholders'
passive role and the managers' active role in the corporation is
maintained.
Suppose, for example, that a corporation's management is
considering a change in the firm's accounting methods that will
result in higher reported profits. Suppose, further, that the managers' compensation includes bonuses based on reported earnings and that other firms in the industry have recently been
targets of hostile takeovers. If the managers enact the change,
will they be vulnerable to a shareholder's claim that they acted
out of self-interest-to increase management bonuses and to
ward off a possible takeover-and thereby breached their duty of
care? The answer is no. A change in accounting practices is not
a matter in which any director has a direct personal stake and,
therefore, it would not trigger duty of loyalty scrutiny. The directors' action will be judged, instead, by the standard of the
business judgment rule and will be presumed proper unless the
shareholder
can prove the managers were grossly negligent or
3 2

reckless.

Smith, 488 A.2d at 873.
See, e.g., Mathewson, supra note 128, at 880 (the rule is "a shield behind which
a director may make.., decisions without the threat of personal liability"); see also
Smith, 488 A.2d at 872 (the rule "exists to protect and promote the full and free
exercise of the [director's] managerial powers.").
132 In Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 387
N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1976), for example, the directors declared a special dividend consisting of the American Express-owned shares of another corporation,
DLJ, in lieu of selling the shares outright and distributing the proceeds to the
American Express shareholders. The outright sale of the DLJ shares would have
constituted a capital loss which could have been offset against other capital gains,
with a tax savings of about $8 million. The directors decided that such a loss would
have a severe detrimental effect on the corporation's stock value and the net income statements, and opted for the special dividend instead. Even though some of
the directors were officers, whose compensation was tied to reported earnings, the
court rejected the suggestion that the directors' decision was tainted by self-interest. According to the court, the directors considered and rejected the sale-loss
transaction and that the decision on how to account for the loss on the corporate
books was protected by the business judgment rule. Id. at 811-12. For an analysis
of Kamin, see John C. Coffee, Jr., & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative
130
131
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How can such a result be rationalized? The best explanation
can be found by examining the expectations of shareholders of
publicly-traded corporations. These shareholders expect to be
passive investors. They expect corporate managers to be welltrained professionals who know how to maximize corporate profits better than shareholders do. These passive investors expect
that the managers' knowledge and energies will be used to maximize corporate profits for the ultimate purpose of increasing
shareholder wealth. Finally, they expect that managers will be
disciplined primarily by active markets-the market for the firm's
product, the market for managerial labor, the market for the corporation's securities and the market for corporate control.
In the hypothetical case, the managers' change in accounting
methods, self-serving though it may be, is not necessarily harmful
to the shareholders. True, it increases the corporation's tax liability. The increase in reported profits might well result in
higher share prices, however, which obviously increases the
wealth of existing shareholders. In addition, the increased earnings might make it easier for the corporation to borrow money at
attractive interest rates, thus enhancing its competitive position
within its product market. As is usually the case in corporate decision making, the managers' action is neither clearly right nor
clearly wrong; as a result, the relevant question is not what the
decision ought to be, but who should make it. The shareholders'
answer is that decision making should rest in the hands of the
managers. To be sure, the shareholders thereby undertake the
risk that managers will make badjudgments. 3 3 Shareholders can
limit or hedge that risk, however, by choosing stock on the basis
of prior management performance and by diversifying their portfolios, as well as by relying on the disciplinary effects of market
forces.
The business judgment rule enforces that understanding. A
shareholder who hales managers into court, charging them with a
breach of fiduciary duty, is, in effect, attempting to exercise some
control over how the managers operate the corporation's business. But for the business judgment rule, individual shareholders would be able to challenge many managerial decisions as
unwise and motivated by the managers' self-interest. The result
Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 293
(1981).
133 SeeJoy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Baldwin
v.Joy, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983) (business judgment rule protects directors from liability for bad judgment decisions).
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would be to render managers' decisions tentative and subject to
oversight by the shareholders-a result directly at odds with the
shareholders' expectations. 13 4 Accordingly, the business judgment rule is best understood as a mechanism that reinforces
shareholder passivity. 3 5 For the rule to be effective, it must necessarily be applied to most informed managerial decisions, excepting only those in which the managers have a direct- and
tangible financial interest.
The traditional rationales justifying the business judgment
rule are unsatisfying. One such rationale is that judges, not being experienced business people, are ill-equipped to secondguess corporate managers and, therefore, should defer to the
managers' judgment. 3 6 That argument suggests, unfairly, that
the business judgment rule is necessary to rein in an unruly judiciary that would otherwise run amok in business matters. The
fact is that courts do not reach out to meddle in corporate affairs.
It is shareholders,not judges, who sue managers for breach of fiduciary duty, who specify the acts complained of and who develop
theories of recovery. Moreover, courts routinely second guess
38

other types of professionals, such as psychiatrists,
3

3

7

architects

9

or accountants,
even though the courts have no more expertise in such fields than in entrepreneurial risk-taking. Merely
pointing to the courts' lack of business acumen fails to articulate
the crucial differences between corporate managers and other
professionals and the rationale for the business judgment rule.
Another explanation for the business judgment rule is that
qualified people will be unwilling to serve as managers unless
they are protected against shareholder suits. 140 That argument

suffers from the same defect as the argument that judges lack
business expertise. Namely, it fails to explain why corporate
managers should be treated differently from other professionals.
134 Subjecting managerial decisions to shareholder oversight might also decrease
shareholder wealth by discouraging managers from taking risks.
135 Cf Ralph A. Peeples, The Use and Misuse of the BusinessJudgment Rule in the Close
Corporation,60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 456, 462 (1985)("In short, judicial deference to
managerial decisions is based on an assumption of stock liquidity.... The [business
judgment] rule is premised on the existence of an alternative economic remedy for
an aggrieved shareholder.").
136 HENRY W. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 231, at 552 (rev. ed.
1946).
137 Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159, 161-62 (Wis. 1988).
138 Donnelly Const. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292, 1295-96 (Ariz.
1984).
139 Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 72 N.W.2d 364, 367-68 (Minn. 1955).
140 ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 123, at 174-75.
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If a business judgment rule is necessary to encourage corporate
managers to serve, why has not a "medical judgment rule" also
evolved to encourage doctors to serve? There is, of course, an
explanation for the difference; but the explanation is not furnished by the bald assertion that directors will not serve unless
they are protected by the business judgment rule. Corporate
managers should be treated differently from doctors, accountants
and other professionals because of the unique expectations of
corporate shareholders that managers will be disciplined by active and impersonal. markets, and that shareholders will refrain
from becoming involved in the management of the firm's
business.
2. Close Corporations
The business judgment rule supports the mutual understanding that exists in publicly traded corporations that shareholders will be passive investors and that managers, disciplined
primarily by market forces, will have broad discretion in directing
the firm's affairs. In owner-managed firms, should the majority
group similarly enjoy broad managerial discretion? The basic
understanding among participants in such firms does support
deference to the majority's judgment for'certain types of actions.
Suppose, for example, that the owner-managers of a firm
disagree about purchasing raw materials from a particular supplier, with the majority voting in favor of the action. It is legitimate to conclude that all the parties had agreed, at the outset, to
be bound by the majority's vote; given such an express or implied
agreement, the minority should not be able to challenge the majority's decision in court. The minority has good reason to accept the majority's decision because its impact will be felt,
proportionately, by all of the owner-managers. If the decision
results in higher profits, all of the participants will benefit, including those who voted against it. If it results in losses, all will
suffer the consequences, including those who vote for it.
The U.P.A. codifies the foregoing observation in providing
that, subject to any contrary agreements, ordinary business matters are to be decided by majority vote of the partners.' 4 ' The
U.P.A. limits this majority-rule principle, however, by requiring
unanimous approval of any action that would contravene the
partners' agreement.' 4 2 This limitation reflects an astute appre141 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT §
142 Id. The U.P.A.'s treatment

18(h).
of majority vote is not without ambiguity because it
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ciation for the extent of power that the owner-managers expect
the majority to have. The owner-managers can hardly be
thought to agree, in advance, that whenever a majority faction
forms among them, that faction may exclude the others from
management, may divert firm profits to themselves or may otherwise abrogate the fundamental terms of their association. 143
In close corporations, however, courts have traditionally accorded majority shareholders the broad protection of the business judgment rule, with the effect of undermining, rather than
reinforcing, the participants' mutual understandings. Because
the business judgment rule insulates the vast majority of managerial decisions from judicial review, it permits majority shareholders to squeeze out the minority-that is, to exclude the minority
from active involvement in the business and from their originally
bargained-for share of firm profits.
A good illustration is provided in Zidell v. Zidell, Inc. 114 In
that case, Arnold Zidell, who owned 37.5% of the shares of related family corporations, sued his brother Emery, the controlling shareholder, to compel a declaration of dividends. The
fails to specify the voting requirement for "middle range" matters-matters that
are neither within the ordinary course of the partnership's business nor in contravention of the partnership agreement. Decisions as to issues such as plant renovation and expansion or sale of important assets apparently require unanimous
consent. 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 5, § 6.03, at 6:45-6:49; Hillman, supra
note 42, at 450-51. This restrictive construction of the term "ordinary matters" is
curious in light of the minority partners' right to dissolve the partnership at will.
That right provides a disincentive for the majority to benefit themselves disproportionately. Accordingly, there is little reason not to allow middle-range matters to
be decided by majority vote.
143 Some courts have suggested, in dictum, that the business judgment rule is
applicable to partnerships. See Bane v. Ferguson, 890 F.2d 11, 14 (7th Cir. 1989);
Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348, 352-53 (Me. 1988). The draft Revised Uniform Partnership Act explicitly rejects a duty of ordinary care for partners, and
instead imposes upon them "a duty of care to act in the conduct of the business of
the partnership in a manner that does not constitute gross negligence or willful
misconduct." REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(d) (Tentative Draft Feb. 7, 1992).
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act draft thus protects controlling partner's actions "in the conduct of the business of the partnership;" it does not, however,
suggest how broadly or narrowly that phrase should be construed. The majority's
decision with respect to ordinary matters, such as whether to purchase supplies
from A or B, should be protected for the reason discussed in the text. The majority's decision to redistribute firm income, however, would seem to be governed by
section 404(b)(1) of the draft Act, which imposes a constructive trust for the partnership on "any property, profit, or benefit derived by the partner without the informed consent of the otherpartners, from a transaction connected with the ...conduct
... of the partnership .. ." Id. § 404(b)(l)(emphasis added). See also 2 BROMBERG
& RIBSTEIN, supra note 5, § 6:07 (discussing the fiduciary duties owed partners).
144 560 P.2d 1086 (Or. 1977) and 560 P.2d 1091 (Or. 1977).
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brothers had each inherited half of their parents' 75% stake in
the businesses and both were active in the businesses, together
with a third partner, Jack Rosenfeld. When Rosenfeld desired to
sell his shares, Emery seized the opportunity to squeeze out Arnold. Without Arnold's knowledge, Emery's son acquired
enough of Rosenfeld's shares to give Emery control, thereby
thwarting Arnold's hope that the corporations would redeem Rosenfeld's stock, which would have left the two brothers as equal
owners. Emery then froze Arnold's salary and increased that of
Emery's son. Arnold eventually resigned over the salary issue
and Emery subsequently voted him off the board of directors.
Emery proceeded to increase his own and his son's salaries and
bonuses, and instituted a policy of paying low dividends to
shareholders.
At that point, the squeeze out was complete. Emery had unilaterally altered the fundamental terms of his association with Arnold and had defeated Arnold's expectation of remaining active
in the business and of receiving an income commensurate with
his 37.5% stake in the business. Even better, from Emery's point
of view, because Arnold's capital stake in the companies remained at risk, Emery was able to appropriate the lion's share of
the companies' profits without shouldering a proportionate share
of the risk. In other words, Emery acquired the use and benefit
of Arnold's capital without paying for it. The Supreme Court of
Oregon upheld Emery's actions because, the court said, they
were protected by the business judgment rule.
Had the Zidell family companies been publicly traded corporations, the court's conclusion would have been unremarkable.
Arnold's specific complaint challenged Emery's dividend policy.
In a publicly traded corporation, the board of directors' dividend
and executive compensation policies are protected by the business judgment rule because they do not raise a direct conflict of
interest. Managers are not directly enriched by a low-dividend
policy. Nor are shareholders directly impoverished by such a
policy inasmuch as an increase in the market value of their stock
provides an adequate substitute for dividends. Moreover, while
executive compensation policies do directly affect managers, individual managers normally abstain from voting on their own
compensation packages and, in any event, compensation policies
are constrained by market forces.
In close corporations, however, owner-managers are directly
affected by dividend and salary policies. To receive an economic
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benefit from their investment, the owner-managers rely on direct
distributions of cash from the firm in the form of either dividends
or salaries. In the close corporation, in other words, dividends
and salaries are essentially fungible. They are interchangeable
means by which the owner-managers realize a return on their investment. In Zidell, the sharp contrast between Emery's conservative dividend policy and his liberality with salaries and
bonuses was a clear warning signal that he was mounting a
squeeze out play against Arnold. The court's mechanical application of a rule designed for publicly traded corporations, however,
prevented the court from appreciating the significance of Emery's conduct and allowed him to squeeze out his brother under
the guise of exercising managerial discretion.
B.

Dissolution
1. Publicly Traded Corporations
There are three approaches that might be taken with respect
to the voluntary dissolution of corporations. First, voluntary dissolution might be permitted only upon the unanimous consent of
all shareholders. Second, voluntary dissolution might be permitted at the express will of any shareholder. The third approach is
the one taken by most states: voluntary dissolution requires the
approval of the corporation's
board of directors and of a majority
45
of the outstanding shares.'

For publicly traded corporations, the requirement of majority approval for voluntary dissolution is attractive largely because
the two alternatives are unworkable. A unanimity requirement
would make voluntary dissolution of the publicly traded corporation virtually impossible because the shareholders' rational apathy will result in some shareholders not voting on a dissolution
proposal. On the other hand, allowing dissolution at the will of
any shareholder would impose ludicrous burdens on the corporation's operations. Technically, dissolution is effected by filing a
certificate with the appropriate state authority attesting that dissolution has been voted on and authorized. 46 Once dissolved, a
corporation may not carry on any business other than that appro145 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 14.02 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1991); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 1900 (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275(a) (1991); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAw § 1001 (McKinney 1986) (allowing dissolution by vote of two-thirds of

all outstanding shareholders).
146 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 14.03(b) (3d ed. 1985); CAL. CORP.
§ 1903(a) (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275(c) (1991); N.Y. Bus.
LAW §§ 1003, 1004 (McKinney 1986).
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priate for liquidation and winding up. 14 7 The image of a lone
shareholder of General Motors triggering a prohibition against
the corporation's engaging in any activity other than winding up
by the simple expedient of filing a certification with the state authority is appealing only for its comedic value; it is not to be
taken seriously.
Beyond being preferable to two untenable alternatives, however, the majority vote rule for voluntary corporate dissolution
has little practical importance for shareholders of publicly traded
corporations because dissolution itself is of little importance to
them. Viewing the corporation from the outside, dissolution
might be perceived as a momentous event. It is, after all, the first
step in the termination of the entity. From the shareholders' perspective, however, the cessation of the corporation's existence is
a meaningless abstraction. What matters to them, concretely, is
that dissolution results in the return to them of their capital stake
in the firm and forces them to seek alternative investment vehicles. Shareholders do have a substantial interest in the liquidity
of their investment (i.e., their ability to retrieve their capital) and
in the stability of their investment (i.e., their ability to invest in a
venture with a particular type and amount of risk). Voluntary dissolution, however, has little bearing on the shareholders' ability
to protect their liquidity or their stability interests.
Shareholders of publicly traded corporations have virtually
no use for dissolution as a means of retrieving their capital. They
can accomplish that result much more cheaply by selling their
shares in the secondary securities market. Moreover, such shareholders do not need to be able to veto a proposed dissolution to
further their stability interests. Shareholders can achieve adequate stability of investment so long as there exist other passive
investment vehicles offering similar return and risk. If adequate
substitutes are available, there is no need for the shareholders'
capital to remain invested in any particular corporation.4
147

2

MODEL

Bus.

CORP. ACT ANN. §

14.05(a) (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1991); CAL.

CORP. CODE § 1903(c) (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278 (1991); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAw § 1005(a)(l) (McKinney 1986).
148 It matters significantly to the shareholders, of course, that they receive a fair

price upon dissolution and liquidation of the firm, but the availability of substitute
investments makes the fact of dissolution essentially immaterial to them. Cf Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (majority shareholder may force a cashout merger on minority shareholders without showing a "legitimate business purpose," but minority shareholders must be paid a fair price for their shares).

688

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

2.

[Vol. 22:646

Close Corporations

While the majority vote requirement for voluntary dissolution seems the best alternative for publicly traded corporations, it
is the worst for owner-managed close corporations. Superficially,
the majority vote rule may seem to be a compromise between the
two "extreme" alternatives-a unanimity requirement, on the
one hand, and dissolution at will, on the other. The unanimity
requirement protects the stability interests of all participants by
giving each veto power against the unwanted disruption occasioned by dissolution. That protection of stability, however, is at
the expense of the shareholders' liquidity interest because it prevents any shareholder from retrieving her capital via dissolution
unless all of her colleagues concur. Conversely, dissolution at
will furthers the shareholders' interest in the liquidity of their investment, but at the expense of stability.
The majority vote rule, supposedly favoring compromise,
however, does not strike a balance between the shareholders' liquidity interests and their interests in the firm's stability. Rather,
the rule protects and advances the liquidity and stability interests
of one group of shareholders, namely the majority shareholders,
at the expense of the minority. If the majority shareholders wish
to liquidate their investment, they are free to dissolve the corporation. Their preference for liquidity overrides the minority's
preference for stability. At the same time, if the majority shareholders want their investment in the firm to remain stable, they
may veto dissolution. In that case, the majority's preference for
stability will override the minority's preference for liquidity.
The majority vote rule, which allows some shareholders to
dissolve the corporation at will-for good reasons, bad reasons
or no reason at all-is profoundly antithetical to the expectations
of participants in owner-managed firms. The participants are not
strangers, separated from each other and bargaining at arm's
length with a view to their own selfish interests. Their relationship is intensely personal. The participants sink their personalities into the venture: their labor, their hopes for the future, their
trust in one another and their respect and concern for each
other. In such a relationship, caring for the other is as basic to
the participants' motivation as is self-interest-which is to say
that their relationship is grounded in reciprocity of concern and
mutuality of respect.

The majority vote rule imposes an entirely different sort of
relationship upon the owner-managers, one marked by a hierar-
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chy of power and vulnerability. The upshot of the rule is that the
minority shareholders, once they have invested in the firm, can
promote neither their interest in the stability of their investment
(because the majority can dissolve at any time) nor their interest
in the liquidity of their investment (because they cannot unilaterally dissolve). The majority, meanwhile, may fully and autonomously promote its own stability and liquidity interests because it
has the prerogative to decide whether to leave its investment in
the firm or withdraw it and deploy it elsewhere. It is difficult to
imagine a regime more hostile to reciprocity of concern and mutuality of respect than the majority vote rule. The rule divides
the owner-managers into two camps, empowering one and rendering the other vulnerable. It reduces their relationship to a
game in which the winners are the ones with the most shares.
PART III

As discussed in Part II, corporate fiduciary duty rules and the
rules on voluntary dissolution operate to reinforce the shareholders' express and implied expectations in publicly traded corporations. Those same rules, however, undermine the parties'
expectations and understandings in owner-managed close corporations. This Part considers alternatives to the traditional corporate rules. First, the modern approach to close corporations is
examined and critiqued. Then, an alternative approach is proposed that explicitly aims at fostering mutual and reciprocal caring in owner-managed firms.
A.

The Modern Approach to Close Corporations

The modern approach to close corporation law is addressed
to a particular problem arising in such entities, namely the
"squeeze out," or oppression, of minority shareholders.1 49 The
squeeze out problem arises out of the interplay of two aspects of
corporate law: the protection given to corporate managers
through the business judgment rule' 50 and the restrictions placed
on the minority shareholders' ability to withdraw their capital
from the firm. Minority shareholders may not initiate a voluntary
dissolution of the corporation' 5 ' and courts have traditionally
149 For cases illustrating the squeeze out problem, see Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307
S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983) and Zidell v. Zidell, 560 P.2d 1086 (Or. 1977) and 560 P.2d
1091 (Or. 1977); see also supra notes 109-11, 144 and accompanying text.

150 See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
151 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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been extremely reluctant to grant judicial dissolution, especially
if the firm is profitable, even when the majority shareholders
have allocated the profits to themselves. 52 Finally, a shareholders' agreement may severely limit the minority shareholders' ability to sell their shares to a third party and, even in the absence of
formal restrictions, the minority will often have enormous difficulty finding a third-party buyer for their stock.' 5 '
If withdrawal were readily available to the minority shareholders, then the grant of wide discretion to the majority shareholders, via the business judgment rule, would not pose a serious
squeeze out threat to the minority. The majority would have less
incentive to .exclude their colleagues from management and to
appropriate the firm's profits to themselves because minority
shareholders could always withdraw their capital. 5 4 Withdrawal
would, in effect, force the majority to pay for the appropriated
profits, eliminating the financial incentive (and, thus, a good deal
of the fun) provided by the squeeze out.
Courts in some jurisdictions have refused to apply the business judgment rule to close corporations in an effort to correct
the squeeze out problem. 15 5 In other jurisdictions, legislatures
have responded to the problem by making it easier for minority
shareholders to withdraw their capital from the firm via judicial
dissolution. 156 Undergirding both of these approaches is the
perception that in close corporations, fiduciary duties, as well as
the remedies for breach of those duties, should arise out of the
participants' reasonable expectations. 157 The states that have
152 See, e.g., Hall v. John S. Isaacs &,Sons Farms, 163 A.2d 288 (Del. 1960) (denying appointment of liquidators for solvent and profitable corporations despite allegations of excessive salaries for majority shareholders and no dividend
declarations).
153 See supra note 53.
154 See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976);
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975);
see also supranote 113 and accompanying text.
155 See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass.
1976); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass.
1975).
156 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30 (1991) (allowing dissolution to protect
the shareholder's rights and interests); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104-a (McKinney
1986 & Supp. 1992) (dissolution should be considered in light of protecting minority shareholder's interests).
157 See In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984); Meiselman v.
Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983); Wilkes v: Springside Nursing Home, Inc.,
353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). The development of the "reasonable expectations"
approach to close corporations has been attributed to Professor F. Hodge O'Neal.
See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 89.
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adopted this approach, wittingly or not, embrace the central
tenet of the nexus of contracts theory of the firm, that the primary role of corporate law should be to enforce the participants'
contract.
1. Elimination of the Business Judgment Rule
In a trio of cases, the Massachusetts courts have imposed restrictions on the discretion of controlling shareholders in close
corporations. In Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England,
Inc.,'"8 the majority shareholders, children of the corporation's
founder, authorized the redemption of their father's stock when
he retired-in effect giving him a lump-sum pension. The majority refused, however, to approve a similar redemption for stock
held by the widow of a shareholder who had been a key employee. The Donahue court held that the widow was entitled to
the same redemption opportunity that was given to the founder.
In its reasoning, the Donahue court declared that close corporations were more like partnerships than publicly traded corporations and, therefore, shareholders of such entities must be held
to the same strict fiduciary duties that are imposed on partners.' 59 Despite that declaration, however, it is clear that the
court did not take the partnership analogy seriously. Under partnership law, if the participants do not specify the firm's duration,
160
any participant may redeem her interest by dissolving at will.

Because the corporation in Donahue was presumably of indefinite
duration, partnership law would irrefutably entitle the widow to
redeem her stock without regard for whether the founder's stock
was also redeemed. Thus, if the court had applied partnership
law, the issue of whether redemption of the founder's stock triggered a redemption right for the widow would have been moot.
The Donahue court, of course, could not apply partnership
law because the applicable corporate statute, absent shareholder
and director deadlock, permitted voluntary dissolution only upon
approval by a majority of the outstanding shares.' 6 ' Nor could
the court be guided by partnership case law. Because minority
partners are specifically permitted to dissolve at will, the problem
158 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
159 Id. at 515. For discussions of Donahue and its progeny, see Steven N. Bulloch,
Heightened Fiduciary Duties in Closely Held Corporations:Donahue Revisited, 16 PAC. L.J.
935 (1985); Henry F. Johnson, Strict FiduciaryDuty in Close Corporations:A Concept in
Search of Adoption, 18 CAL. W. L. REV. 1 (1982).
160 UNIF. PARTNERSHiP Ac-r § 31.
161 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 99(a) (West 1970).

692

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 22:646

of selective redemption of partnership shares does not arise. On
the other hand, the court's invocation of the partners' fiduciary
duty of "utmost good faith and loyalty" served as a compelling
rhetorical device to justify what the court actually did in Donahue:
it abrogated the business judgment rule for close corporations.
If the business judgment rule had been applied, it would have
barred the widow's complaint because a refusal to redeem stock
does not involve corporate managers in a direct conflict of interest. 16 2 Rather than accept the majority's judgment that refusing
to redeem the widow's stock was best for the corporation, the
Donahue court, in essence, subjected the redemption to a fairness
review. The court concluded, from its fairness review, that a selective redemption of stock from a member of the control group
within a close corporation is never fair. If a control-group member's stock is redeemed, all other shareholders must be given an
63
equal opportunity for such redemption.'
The Massachusetts court soon backed away from its sweeping "equal opportunity" position but continued to refuse to apply the business judgment rule to close corporations. In Wilkes v.
Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 6 the court was presented with a
garden variety squeeze-out case in which the majority shareholders fired the minority shareholder, refused to declare dividends
and offered to buy the minority's shares for a very low price. The
court ruled that when a minority shareholder is harmed by the
majority's action, the majority has the burden of proving that it
acted to accomplish a legitimate business purpose. Further, the
majority may still be liable to the minority if the minority demonstrates that the majority's legitimate purposes could have been
accomplished by means less damaging to the minority's interests.
The burden-shifting scheme devised in Wilkes effectively deprives majority shareholders of the protection of the business
judgment rule by requiring close judicial scrutiny of the majority's action whenever the minority is harmed. Further, in requiring the controlling shareholders to accomplish their purposes in
the way that is least harmful to the minority, the Wilkes court
worked a subtle transformation of the fiduciary duties of close
corporation participants. Each faction, when pursuing its interests, must be sensitive to the interests and expectations of the
other participants. That mandate, moreover, applies to minority
162
163
164

See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 521.
353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).

1992]

CLOSE CORPORATIONS

693

as well as majority shareholders. In Smith v. Atlantic Properties,
Inc., 165 a minority shareholder was held to have breached his fiduciary duty when he exercised a veto power in a way that
did not
account for the majority shareholders' expectations. 6 6
2.

Loosening Restrictions on Judicial Dissolution

Courts have traditionally strained not to grant judicial dissolution of a corporation, viewing dissolution as a drastic, undesirable remedy. Such reticence is not without reason. The
statutory procedures attendant upon judicial dissolution contemplate a sheriff's sale-i.e., piecemeal liquidation-of the corporate assets, payment of all debts and distribution of any
remaining cash to the shareholders.' 67 Such a winding up process is seemingly often a wasteful endeavor. Because the enterprise is not sold as a going concern, the shareholders lose the
value of the firm's goodwill, employees lose theirjobs and suppliers lose a steady source of income. 6 It is important to understand, however, that corporate dissolution does not always result
in a wasteful liquidation. Even when a court orders dissolution,
the company may be sold as a going concern before the actual
liquidation sale, either to one of the warring shareholder groups
or to a third party. In such a case, both the goodwill value of the
enterprise and the positions of employees and suppliers are
preserved.
In recent years, some states have expanded the grounds for
involuntary dissolution. In addition to the traditional grounds,
the newer statutes also grant judicial dissolution when it is neces422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
Such restrictions on shareholders' freedom of action have been characterized
as an application of "heightened" fiduciary duties. See Thompson, supra note 36, at
398; Bulloch, supra note 159, at 938-40; Johnson, supra note 159, at 15. Judge
Easterbrook and Professor Fischel have commented that close corporations do not
need "more" fiduciary duties, but that the existing corporate fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care should perhaps be applied differently in close corporations to account for their special character. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 233.
That is in essence what the modern approach does. It applies the duty of loyalty to
the close corporation shareholders, but recognizes conflicts of interest in such matters as dividends and executive salaries, areas which would not be considered to
create conflicts of interest in publicly traded corporations.
167 See 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. ch. 14 (3d ed. 1985).
168 Such concerns are reminiscent of the concerns raised with respect to "bustup" hostile takeovers of publicly traded corporations. See Millon, supra note 31, at
232. The difference in the publicly traded corporation context is that the bust-up
often consists of selling discrete corporate divisions or subsidiaries as going concern businesses. The shareholders, therefore, receive the going concern values of
the corporation's constituent parts.
165
166
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sary "to protect the rights or interests" of the complaining shareholder, 169 when it is the only feasible way for the complaining
shareholders to obtain a "fair return on their investment,"'1 70 or
when those in control are acting in a way that is "unfairly prejudicial"' 71 to the complaining shareholder.

These same statutes also provide alternative remedies short
of dissolution. Some statutes allow the court to appoint a temporary director for the corporation or to become, itself, involved in
management by ordering the majority shareholders to undertake
or undo particular actions. 172 The wisdom of such an approach is
questionable and there are few cases in which a court has availed
itself of such powers. The other alternative remedy, which courts
have used more frequently, is to give the majority shareholders
or the corporation the option to buy the complaining minority's
interest rather than undergo dissolution and liquidation.171 Such
an alternative's utility is obvious. The minority shareholder retrieves her capital stake, often for a higher price than liquidation
would have provided, and the majority shareholders may continue to operate the firm and retain its profits. It is worth noting,
however, that these statutes do not give the complaining shareholder the right to demand a buyout on grounds of oppression
or illegality. Rather, it is the majority shareholders who may derail the dissolution suit by buying the plaintiff's shares.
Courts interpreting these statutes have taken a decidedly
contractarian view of the close corporation. In general, they hold
that a minority shareholder is entitled to relief when the majority
faction has frustrated the minority's "reasonable expectaN.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30(2)(ii) (1991).
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104-a(b)(1) (McKinney 1986).
4 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN., MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPP.
§ 40(a)(l) (3d ed. 1985). The Statutory Close Corporation Supplement has not
been widely adopted by states adopting the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act. Changes in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments Pertaining to
Closely Held Corporations, 46. Bus. LAW. 297, 297 (1990). While the drafters of the
Model Act considered repealing the Supplement, they elected not to do so. Id. at
299.
172 See 4 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN., MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SuPP.
§ 41 (3d ed. 1985). North Carolina recently eliminated such alternative relief
measures froi its statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-31 cmt. (1991).
173 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1118(a) (McKinney Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-14-31(d) (1991); 4 MODEL BUS. CORP. AcT. ANN. § 14.34. The Statutory Close
Corporation Supplement to the Model Business Corporation Act allows a court to
order a buyout of the plaintiff's shares, not at the option of the defendants, but
rather if "ordinary relief" (under which the court becomes involved in managing
the corpoiation) would be inadequate or inappropriate. 4 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT
ANN., MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPP. § 42 (3d ed. 1985).
169
170
171
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tions."' 74 The courts further recognize that close corporation
shareholders expect to receive a fair return on their investment 7 5 and to be involved in management and receive a salary. 1 76 But, notwithstanding such generalized notions, the
complaining shareholders still bear a substantial burden of proving their entitlement to dissolution. In particular, the complaining minority shareholder must demonstrate that her
colleagues understood and acquiesced in her expectations and
that the frustration of those expectations was not her own
fault. 7 7 In Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Corp.,178 a shareholder who was difficult to work with, alienated other employees
(provoking some to quit), and resigned from the company a
number of times without notice to his colleagues, was eventually
fired. The court indicated that, although at the outset he had a
reasonable expectation in continued employment with the corporation, his own misconduct justified his colleagues' action in fir79
ing him. 1

In developing the reasonable expectations approach to judicial dissolution of close corporations, the courts nearly always
analogize close corporations to partnerships. 8 0 And indeed, the
emerging rule that minority shareholders are entitled to judicial
174 See, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984)
("much will depend on the circumstances in the individual case"); Meiselman v.
Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 565 (N.C. 1983) ("Thus, [the complaining shareholder's] 'rights or interests' must be defined with reference to the 'rights or interests' the complaining shareholder has under the facts of the particular case-the
,reasonable expectations' the participants' relationship has generated."); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 NJ. Super. 141, 155, 400 A.2d 554, 561 (Law
Div. 1979) ("a court must determine initially the understanding of the parties").
175 In re Kemp, 473 N.E.2d at 1180.
176 Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 551.
177 The court in Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 330 S.E.2d 649 (N.C. Ct. App.
1985), summarized the elements of the plaintiff's case:
"[the] plaintiff must show that: (1) he had one or more substantial
reasonable expectations known or assumed by the other participants;
(2) the expectation has been frustrated; (3) the frustration was not
plaintiff's fault and was in large part beyond plaintiff's control; and
(4) under all the circumstances of the case, plaintiff is entitled to some
form of equitable relief."
Lowder, 330 S.E.2d at 655.
178 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (Law Div. 1979).
179 Exadaktilos, 167 NJ. Super. at 156, 400 A.2d at 562. The court did, however,
give the plaintiff an opportunity to prove that his former colleagues' withholding of
dividends was oppressive, entitling him to a court-ordered dissolution. Id.
180 These courts note that close corporation shareholders often think of themselves as partners, and that, like partners, they expect an active role in the firm's
operation. See Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 565.
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dissolution when their reasonable expectations have been frustrated echoes the rule for judicial dissolution of partnerships.
Under the U.P.A., any partner may obtain judicial dissolution
when her colleagues have persistently breached the parties'
agreement. 81' Despite this mild rapprochement, however, the
ability of close corporation shareholders to withdraw their capital
from the firm is not comparable to the withdrawal rights of partners. The U.P.A.'s provisions on judicial dissolution operate in
conjunction with its provisions on voluntary dissolution. As
shown in the following discussion, under the U.P.A.'s scheme of
voluntary and judicial dissolution, a partner's ability to withdraw
depends upon whether the dissolving partner has agreed, in some
fashion, to restrictions on that ability. By contrast, a close corporation shareholder's ability to withdraw depends, simply, on the
size of her ownership interest.
Partnership law recognizes two basic types of partnerships:
those that are dissolvable at will and those that are not. Every
partnership is dissolvable "at will" unless the partners have
agreed to restrict their withdrawal rights.'8 2 The partners may so
agree by, for example, constituting the firm for a specific term of
years or for the accomplishment of a particular task. In such
cases, the partners' agreement is that they will keep their capital
locked into the firm for the specified period or for a length of
time reasonably necessary to accomplish the task.'8 3 In addition,
sometimes partners agree to other restrictions on their ability to
withdraw their capital from the firm. They may, for example, define the circumstances under which a partner may retire, set a
formula for the purchase of the retiring partner's interest or
agree that the remaining partners will leave their capital in the
firm and continue the business, notwithstanding the retiring part84
ner's withdrawal.1
If a partnership is dissolvable at will, each partner may withdraw her capital from the firm at any time by dissolving. '85 Each
partner, further, has the right to demand a liquidation of the
partnership-that is, sale of the firm's assets, payment of all creditors and distribution of any remaining cash to all partners. 186 In
181 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 32.
182 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31.
183 See Zeibak v. Nasser, 82 P.2d
184 See Pilch v. Milliken, 200 Cal.

1962).
185 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT
186 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT

375 (Cal. 1938).
App. 2d 212, 19 Cal. Rptr. 334 (Cal. Ct. App.

§ 31.
§ 38(1).
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practice, of course, not every dissolving partner will exercise her
right to liquidate the firm. Often she will simply sell her interest
to the remaining partners-and the U.P.A. provides for that possibility. The U.P.A. provides that when the partnership business
is continued after dissolution, the withdrawing partner is entitled
to receive the value of her interest in the partnership; that is, her
proportional share of the value of the entire firm. 187 The selling
partner's right to demand liquidation gives the remaining partners an incentive to offer a reasonable price because, if they offer
an unreasonably low price, the dissolving partner will opt to liquidate and leave them in a worse position.
On the other hand, no partner has the right to dissolve a
partnership in contravention of the partnership agreement. Partners do have the power (as opposed to the right) to dissolve a
partnership in spite of their agreement to the contrary,' 88 but the
U.P.A. subjects the dissolving partner to liability for damages
caused by the wrongful dissolution.'
Further, a wrongfully dissolving partner has neither the right nor the power to demand
liquidation of the partnership.'9 0 In the event of premature dissolution of a term partnership, the non-dissolving partners may
continue the business of the partnership and retain the dissolving
partner's interest until the expiration of the term.' 9 '
Because every partner has the right to dissolve an at-will
partnership, recourse to judicial dissolution of the partnership
comes into play only when the partners have agreed to create a
partnership for a term or otherwise restrict their withdrawal
rights. The U.P.A.'s judicial dissolution provision provides an escape hatch for partners who have made such agreements. If the
dissolving partners can demonstrate that their colleagues are
guilty of violating the partnership agreement, they will be enti9 2
tled to judicial dissolution.

The statutory scheme for dissolution of partnerships, then,
may be summarized as follows. A partner's capital may be locked
into the firm only to the extent that she agrees to be locked in.
Even if she agrees to be locked in, release from the agreement
may be obtained, via judicial dissolution, if her co-partners have
themselves breached the agreement. The modern approach to
187 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT
188 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT
189 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT

§ 42.
§ 31(l)(b).
§ 38(2).

190 Id. § 38(1).

19' Id. § 38(2).
192 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT

§ 32(1)(d).
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close corporation dissolution does not nearly replicate this
scheme, but rather, establishes the following regime. Whether a
close corporation shareholder has agreed to lock her capital stake
into the firm is immaterial; what matters is how much stock she
owns. If'she owns less than a majority of the shares, her capital
will be locked in until the majority shareholders release it-except that a court-ordered release may be had if the majority frustrates her reasonable expectations.
This contrast between the dissolution rules for partnerships
and the modem regime's dissolution rules for close corporations
identifies the weakness of the rhetorical appeals to partnership
law which are so characteristic of the modem judiciary's approach to close corporation dissolution. It can be argued, nonetheless, that the modem regime's rules, though they differ from
the partnership rules, are appropriate for certain close corporations, namely those in which some shareholders have neither the
expectation nor the desire to be actively engaged in management. For owner-managed close corporations, however, the
modem regime continues to undermine the participants' basic
understanding that they will, reciprocally, respect each other and
care for each other's interests.
To be sure, the modem regime represents an advance over
the application of traditional corporate law rules to owner-managed corporations. Its greatest achievement is the restriction of
the business judgment rule which, as discussed earlier, has only a
narrow legitimate role to play in owner-managed firms.1 93 In addition, the liberalized grounds for judicial dissolution may make
it more palatable for minority shareholders to be locked into the
firm at the majority's discretion. Though locked in, the minority
may be subjected to. less oppression or exploitation. Still, the
modem regime retains the majority vote rule for voluntary dissolution. By imposing an artificial hierarchy upon owner-managers, that rule constricts the mutual trust and reciprocal caring
that naturally arises in close personal relationships and emphasizes-even encourages-gamesmanship and jockeying for
position.
B. A Suggested Alternative
In this section, the two alternative rules for voluntary dissolution of owner-managed close corporations-requiring unani193

See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
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mous consent and permitting dissolution at will-are considered,
with a view to identifying which (if either) alternative fits ownermanagers' basic expectations better than the majority vote
rule. 9 4 At the outset, the general criteria against which to evaluate these alternatives should be summarized. The most appropriate rule for voluntary dissolution would recognize that ownermanagers enter into a close, personal relationship. The rule
would recognize, further, that the fundamental characteristic of a
close personal relationship is caring. 95 Caring consists of being
receptive to the other's reality and responsive to the other's
needs and desires. Simultaneously, it requires being attentive to
one's own needs and desires, and honestly communicating these
concerns with the other.' 96 In a caring relationship, the parties
are receptive and responsive to each other, and communicate
honestly with each other. By means of their continuous communication, receptivity and response, they work together for mutual
benefit.
A legal regime that best accounts for these attributes of the
participants' relationship would be one that, at least, encourages
communication among the parties. The legal scheme would also
encourage the parties to behave responsibly toward one another-not only in the sense of living up to their promises or
commitments, but also in the sense of being responsive to each
other's needs. A regime that requires the participants to behave
responsibly toward each other, however, would be unacceptable.
An action is not authentically responsible unless it is freely chosen. 1 7 A regime that gives a participant no practical option ex194 At first blush, yet another alternative might be suggested, namely, giving each
shareholder the right to demand a buyout of her shares at any time-a put option,
in other words. It turns out, however, that a put option is only a slight variation on
the right to dissolve at will. Both the put option and the right to dissolve at will
allow any shareholder to withdraw her capital from the firm at any time.
195 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
196 See NODDINGS, supra note 23 and accompanying text.
197 See RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL
PSYCHOLOGY (Ferdinand Schoeman ed. 1987); ESSAYS ON FREEDOM OF ACTION (Ted
Honerich ed. 1973); RESPONSIBILITY (Carl J. Friedrich ed. 1960). In relationships
between unequal parties, we may wish to sacrifice some part of an individual's freedom to act virtuously or not. In the parent-child relationship, for example, we may
impose a legal obligation upon the parent to provide for the feeding, clothing and
housing of the child, and to refrain from physically abusing the child. These obligations, however, are minimal constraints on the parent's freedom to respond or
not respond to the child's needs and are specifically aimed at providing the child
with the minimum requirements for survival. In relationships among equals-such
as in the owner-managed firm-the participants can provide for their own minimal
survival. The question is to what extent the law should leave participants free to
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cept to serve her colleagues' needs or desires is not promoting
responsibility-it is creating servitude. What is needed, then, is a
set of rules that will encourage the parties to talk and to listen to
each other and that will enable them to act responsibly, but without forcing them to do so.
1.

Unanimous Consent for Voluntary Withdrawal

One alternative to the majority vote requirement is to permit
voluntary dissolution only upon the unanimous consent of the
participants. A unanimous consent rule might be objectionable
on the ground that it gives a minority shareholder the opportunity to extort a disproportionate share of dissolution proceeds
from the majority who wish to dissolve. While the unanimity requirement gives minority shareholders that power to extort, it
also gives every shareholder the same power. That is an advantage, not a disadvantage, of the unanimous consent requirement.
Under the rule, all shareholders are simultaneously empowered
to exploit their colleagues and simultaneously vulnerable to exploitation. The interdependence that arises out of the unanimity
requirement reflects the interdependence that inheres in the
owner-managers' relationship ' 9g and reinforces the reciprocal
nature of their interaction. In that sense, the unanimity requirement does provide a better "fit" with the owner-managers' expectations than does the majority vote rule.
There are, however, other objections to the requirement of
unanimous consent. First, because any shareholder may hold out
against dissolution, the rule may erect too rigid a barrier against
the shareholders' ability to redeploy their capital to more valued
uses. The economy as a whole is healthiest when capital moves
freely to the most highly valued uses. Allowing any shareholder
to veto dissolution may thus restrain overall economic efficiency.
Second, while the unanimous consent requirement might
appear to be aimed at preserving the community and encouraging the participants to behave responsibly toward each other, it
does not have that effect. The analogy of dissolution of ownermanaged firms to divorce, albeit imperfect, is instructive in this
context. Until recently, the effect of divorce laws was to allow
voluntary dissolution of the marriage only upon the unanimous
choose between their own interests in the liquidity and stability of their investment
and that of their colleagues.
198 See NODDINGS, supra note 23, at 49 ("In all we discuss here, we shall be reminded of our fundamental relatedness, of our dependence upon each other.").
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consent of husband and wife. 19 9 That regime was ultimately
abandoned in favor of allowing either spouse to obtain a divorce,
essentially at will. 200 This reform, however, did not significantly
increase the rate of divorce. However laudable the goal of community preservation may be, a unanimous consent rule for dissolution of marriage thus did not preserve the community any
better than the current, at-will dissolution rule does. The experience with divorce reform suggests that requiring unanimous consent for dissolution of owner-managed firms will not necessarily,
or even probably, have the desired effect of encouraging the
participants to resolve their differences and preserve the
relationship.
It can be argued that a unanimous consent rule for dissolution is nonetheless desirable because, in making voluntary dissolution difficult to achieve, it at least asserts communitarian values.
The difficulty with that argument is that, to the extent that the
rule gives the participants no option but to remain in the relationship, it deprives them of the freedom to engage in authentically
responsible behavior. Moreover, in a close personal relationship,
attentiveness to one's own needs and desires is as important as
responsiveness to the other's. A participant who is forced to remain in the enterprise, in derogation of her own needs, is deprived of the ability to care for her colleagues and is instead
placed in the position of simply serving their interests. Surely it
is a perversion of communitarian values to force community on
an unwilling participant.
In sum, while a requirement of unanimous consent for voluntary dissolution reinforces the interdependent and reciprocal
nature of the owner-managers' relationship, it carries significant
disadvantages. It inhibits, perhaps too much, the free flow of
capital and it requires each owner-manager to serve the interests
of her colleagues, thereby depriving her of the opportunity for
authentic, responsible behavior.
199 Divorce laws generally permitted divorce only for cause. Under such a regime, however, spouses could collude to obtain a divorce decree by default judgment, thereby effectively dissolving their marriage even in the absence of statutorily
defined cause. For a discussion of recent legal trends in divorce law, see LYNNE
CAROL HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM (1980).
200 In many states, divorce may be obtained on the ground that the spouses have
lived apart for a specified period of time. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 466- 40
(West 1986) (eighteen months); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2 (West 1987) (eighteen
months); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.010 (Michie 1986) (twelve months).
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Dissolution At Will

Permitting any shareholder to dissolve an owner-managed
close corporation at will reinforces the reciprocal and interdependent nature of the participants' relationship in much the same
way that the unanimous consent rule does. It gives every shareholder the power to act on her own desire for liquidity, rather
than reserving that power exclusively to the majority shareholders. At the same time, every shareholder, majority and minority
alike, is vulnerable to her colleagues' desire for liquidity.
To be sure, allowing dissolution at will permits any shareholder to engage in strategic misbehavior. Such actions, however, may be redressed through fiduciary duty principles, as in
Page v. Page.2 ° ' In that case, two partners operated an unprofitable business for eight years when, with the opening of a military
base nearby, the firm's prospects suddenly looked promising. At
that point, one partner dissolved, intending to buy back the
firm's assets at a bargain price in a liquidation sale, thus effectively excluding his partner from the now profitable business.
The court ruled that the dissolving partner had a fiduciary obligation to share the firm's "new-found prosperity" with his colleague by paying the going concern value, rather than liquidation
value, for the non-dissolving partner's interest in the firm.
While fiduciary obligation principles can provide redress to a
squeezed out participant, such principles cannot necessarily be
relied upon to redress all types of strategic dissolutions. A participant may, for example, threaten to dissolve the firm unless
she receives a greater share of its income. If the co-venturers feel
that the threatening party's contribution is crucial to the firm's
success, they may view the demand as a form of extortion. But,
unless the threatening party is attempting to deprive her co-venturers of the corporation's assets, profits or future prospects,
there is no fiduciary breach simply from choosing to withdraw
the investment due to dissatisfaction with its monetary return.
That the at-will voluntary dissolution rule permits the shareholders to act strategically, however, does not necessarily mean
that such a rule should be rejected. First, any voluntary dissolution rule permits strategic behavior. More importantly, to enable
the participants to behave responsibly, they must have a meaningful choice between promoting their own interests and responding to the needs of their colleagues. The ability to engage
201

359 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1961).
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in strategic behavior, in other words, is an inevitable consequence of having the freedom to take responsible action.
Allowing dissolution at will, moreover, actually discourages
strategic behavior which both of the alternative dissolution rules
permit-namely, the squeeze-out of the minority shareholder. If
either majority vote or unanimous consent is required for voluntary dissolution, the minority shareholders' only recourse, when
faced with a squeeze-out, is to sue for breach of a fiduciary
duty20 2 or for judicial dissolution because the minority share-

holder's reasonable expectations have been frustrated.2 °3 If,
however, dissolution at will is permitted, then the oppressed minority shareholder has a less costly remedy; she may simply dissolve, retrieve her capital stake and seek other investments-and
other, more trustworthy, relationships.
Another advantage of dissolution at will is that it may result
in a greater likelihood that the participants will directly confront
their problems by talking and listening to each other. Suppose,
for example, a corporation is composed of shareholders A, B and
C, each with a one-third interest. A and B believe that C is not
contributing her fair share to the enterprise. If dissolution is permitted only upon majority vote or by unanimous consent, A and
B might, but need not, approach C and discuss their concerns.
They have a readily available alternative: without attempting to
talk or listen to C, A and B can simply reduce C's salary, secure in
the knowledge that C's only recourse is to the courts. On the
other hand, if dissolution at will is available, A and B will hesitate
to reduce C's salary because C could respond by dissolving the
firm. A and B might choose to dissolve the firm themselves, of
course, without discussing the matter with C. Dissolution involves costs, however, and to avoid those costs, A and B might
first attempt to resolve their differences with C through discussion and compromise.
Suppose, conversely, that C believes she is being undercompensated for her contribution to the venture. If either majority
vote or unanimous consent is required to dissolve the firm, C has
no option except to verbalize her dissatisfaction to A and B and
hope that they will be receptive (as a minority shareholder C can
neither dissolve nor increase her own compensation). A and B,
however, are free to ignore the complaint and refuse to discuss
the matter. Conversely, if at will dissolution is permitted, C can
202 See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
203 See Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983).
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command the attention of A and B because of C's option to act
on her dissatisfaction by dissolving. A and B might refuse to discuss the matter and allow the dissolution-or they themselves
might dissolve the firm. But, again, all of the parties might well
take the less dramatic step of discussing their problem, with a
view to reaching a compromise, before incurring the costs of
dissolution.
There are, to be sure, disadvantages to allowing any ownermanager to dissolve the firm at will. Dissolution is disruptive to
those whose interests lie in preserving the stability of the firm.
The remaining participants suffer the loss of capital and, perhaps, services to the enterprise. If they wish to continue the business, the remaining partners must raise the money to buy out the
dissolving shareholder's stock. The disruption, however, should
not be overstated. The remaining parties will often have a considerable bargaining advantage over the selling shareholder.
They know that the minimum acceptable price is an amount
equal to the liquidation value. Depending on the in terrorem effect
a threatened liquidation has on the remaining shareholders, they
may be able to capture all or a portion of the seller's goodwill in
the business. That may be of little comfort, of course, if they do
not have the funds to pay the liquidation value to the seller.
Again, however, the seller's willingness to accept a price equal to
the liquidation value may provide a substantial boon to the buyers. The seller may accept payment over time if the present value
of the future payout equals or exceeds the liquidation value.
Thus, it is possible for the buying shareholders not only to capture part of the seller's share of goodwill, but also to use the corporation's future profits to pay for the buyout.
Dissolution would result in actual liquidation of the firm, and
the remaining shareholders' loss of their business, only if the
present value of the corporation's projected profits are lower
than its liquidation value. If that is the case, either the business is
marginal and headed for insolvency or the corporate assets are
not being put to their most valued use. In either event, it is not
clear that the advantages of dissolution at will should be foregone in order to preserve the stability of such firms.
In addition to the remaining 'shareholders, the firms' employees and suppliers may suffer as a result of a dissolution. If
liquidation results, employees lose theirjobs and suppliers lose a
customer. Disruption may also result even if there is a buyout of
the dissolving shareholder's shares. The business may, at least
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temporarily, contract-either because of the loss of the dissolver's contribution or because of a cash squeeze occasioned by
the buyout-resulting in employee layoffs and reduced orders for
materials. These third party effects will be felt, however, no matter what requirements exist for the voluntary dissolution of the
firm. Such third parties may well have some cognizable interest
in the stability of their relationships with the owner-managers. °4
It is better to address the protection of such interests directly,
however, rather than indirectly by focusing on the owner-managers' right to withdraw their capital from the firm.
In sum, allowing the owner-managed close corporation to be
dissolved at the will of any shareholder, while not a panacea, is
the best available rule for voluntary dissolution of such firms.
Unfortunately, that rule permits shareholders to behave irresponsibly toward their colleagues, but that is unavoidable.
Shareholders will not be able to take authentically responsible
action unless they are free to choose whether or not to be responsive to the other's needs. Moreover, the dissolution at will
rule provides a low-cost mechanism to deter one form of strategic behavior, namely the majority shareholders' squeeze-out of
the minority. Perhaps most importantly, the dissolution at will
rule encourages the parties to resolve their differences by discussion and compromise in ways that the majority vote and unanimity dissolution rules do not. By encouraging meaningful
communication, rather than questionable strategic tactics, the
dissolution at will rule enables the participants to engage actively
in a caring relationship.
C. A Final Note: Setting the Default Rule and Opting Out
While this article has concluded that, as a general matter,
dissolution at will best comports with the expectations of ownermanagers, there is no reason for such a rule to be mandatory.
Some other rule may be better suited to particular owner-managers in particular firms and therefore the participants should be
able to restrict their ability to withdraw from the firm by
agreement.
In some cases, for example, the shareholders may prefer to
lock in their investments for a fixed period of time to give the
venture a chance to succeed. They can accomplish that by forming a corporation akin to the partnership for a term. Partnership
204 For a discussion of whether and how to protect those interests, see Macey,
supra note 33.
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rules on term partnerships, however, are problematic and should
not be applied to close corporations.2 °5 Under the U.P.A., a part6
ner has the power to dissolve a term partnership prematurely. 20
To be sure, the dissolving partner pays a price for premature dissolution. The withdrawn capital does not include goodwill and is
reduced by any damages caused by the premature dissolution.
Even worse, the dissolving partner may not receive her capital
until the expiration of the term. 20 7 Still, the capital which is ultimately received is calculated as of the time of the premature dissolution.20 8 In effect, upon dissolution, the dissolving partner
has protected her capital against any further risks of the business.
This aspect of partnership law, which allows free dissolution of a
term partnership and protection of the dissolving partner's interest, has been convincingly criticized 20 9 and should be avoided in
close corporation law. Shareholders who agree to put their capital at risk in the firm for a specified period of time should be held
to that agreement.
Should the shareholders also be able to opt out of dissolution at will by means of a provision that the firm may only be
dissolved by majority vote? Ordinarily, parties should be bound
by their express agreements. This particular provision, however,
is deceptive and is, therefore, a trap for the unwary. It is dangerously attractive because it evokes the abstract principle of majority rule, a notion held precious in a democratic society. 210
Because its surface appeal hides its actual impact, however,
shareholders who accept it may find themselves bound to an arrangement that contradicts their actual intentions. Accordingly,
a majority vote requirement for voluntary dissolution should be
enforceable only if it is clear that the parties actually intended to
empower the majority shareholders to exploit their colleagues
and, at the same time, intended to protect the majority against
being exploited.
It can be argued that it is not necessary to change the current
rule for voluntary dissolution of close corporations. Because
205

See Hillman, supra note 2.
§ 31(1)(b).

206 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT
207 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT
208

§ 38(2).

Id.

209 Hillman, supra note 2, at 693-94 (arguing that the sanctions against the dissolving partner are economically insignificant).
210 See 2 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 89, § 10.04 at 9-10 (positing that the
courts accord the majority rule principle the same sanctity in close corporation as it
is given in the political worlds).
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both the current rule and the proposed dissolution at will rule
are merely default rules, owner-managers have full freedom to
choose which dissolution rule best suits them.2 1' Shareholders,
or their lawyers, who agree with the observations offered here
can simply include a dissolution-at-will provision in their articles
of incorporation. 2 12 Those who do not adopt such a provision

can be presumed to desire to be bound by the current rule requiring majority vote for dissolution.
That argument is flawed, however. First, the purpose of a
default rule is to provide the contract term that the parties would
have chosen had they actually negotiated, and thus to reduce the
costs of bargaining. If, as argued herein, the majority vote requirement for dissolution is not in line with the parties' tacit understandings, then, to give legal effect to their understandings,
they must incur the cost of contracting around the inappropriate
rule. Such costs are not limited to the out-of-pocket expenses
incurred in negotiating around the default rule. They include the
risk that the parties will contract for the wrong rule 21 3 and the
cost of overcoming the obstacles to the ex ante bargaining which
faces entrepreneurs anxious to get a venture under way. 14
Second, shareholders of owner-managed close corporations,
more than investors in more sophisticated enterprises, will often
fail to contract around the default rule even though it runs
counter to their preferences. Such enterprisers often do not
know what the law's default rules are and have neither the time to
become familiar with the law's quirks nor the money to hire lawyers with sufficient expertise to advise them. 1 5 While ignorance
211 See Black, supra note 74, at 557 ("Factors that limit the importance of default
rules in corporate law include: (i) even unsophisticated decisionmakers invariably
consult experts (called lawyers); (ii) the experts see similar issues repeatedly and
develop standard solutions; and (iii) the cost of using a privately developed standard form instead of [a statutory or] government[] form is small.").
212 A number ofjurisdictions explicitly permit close corporations to provide for
dissolution at will in their articles. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 355 (1991); MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 100(a) (West 1970). Even in jurisdictions without such
legislation, a shareholder agreement providing for dissolution at will would, in all
likelihood, be enforceable. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577 (I1. 1964)
(granting specific performance of close corporation shareholders' agreement for
guaranteed dividends, guaranteed salary and management rights).
213 See Thompson, supra note 36, at 386 (Default rules "might lower the risk that
the parties would contract for the wrong rule; it makes sophisticated legal rules
available even to unsophisticated investors.").
214 See Hillman, supra note 42, at 433-42 (discussing obstacles to ex ante bargaining in partnerships).
215 Even though a close corporation is almost always formed with the assistance
of a lawyer, the lawyer's function is often simply to prepare a bare-bones charter
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of the law usually cannot justify evasion of the law's consequences, it does seem unfair to hold unsophisticated owners of
small firms to rules to which they have not, and in fact; would not
have, agreed. That is especially true with respect to the majority
vote requirement for dissolution, which, as argued herein, seriously distorts the nature of the owner-managers' relationship.
More importantly, default rules are normative. They are
based on what we think shareholders would agree to if the shareholders were reasonable and so establish rules that shareholders
should accept. 21 6 Default rules thus express and seek to enforce a
system of values.2 1 7 That default rules are value-laden is as it
should be. The default rule currently in place for the voluntary
dissolution of owner-managed close corporations, however-allowing some participants, but not others, to dissolve at will-enforces the wrong values. It seeks to ignore, or suppress, the
reality that caring is a central attribute of close, personal relationships. It imposes an artificial hierarchy upon the participants' association and encourages them to respond to dissension
strategically, rather than cooperatively.
The value that the law should promote in owner-managed
firms, rather, is the value of caring-that is, of enabling the participants to be attentive to their own needs and desires, and also
receptive and responsive to their co-venturers' needs and
desires. The rule proposed in this article, allowing dissolution of
the enterprise at the will of any owner-manager, seeks to encourage the parties to resolve their differences by talking, listening and compromising. It seeks to allow them to pursue their
own, and each other's, welfare in a healthy and caring
relationship.
which accepts all of the state law's default rules. Clients may not have the money to
hire the educative services of a lawyer and the lawyers' efforts to focus their clients'
attention on certain default rules run the risk of souring the venture from the outset. See id. at 435-39.
216 See Millon, supra note 31, at 204 ("legal theories [about the corporation] are
based on positive or descriptive assertions about the world-assertions about what
corporations are. In a characteristic form of legal argument, normative implications
then are said to follow from the positive assertion") (emphasis in original).
217 That the law, in general, expresses values has been noted in other contexts.
See, e.g., Katherine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 293
(1988)(law is "a system that produces and reproduces the dispositions and values
of its citizens").

